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Abstract:
We give an alternative proof that every two-person non-zero-sum absorb-
ing positive recursive stochastic game with finitely many states has approx-
imate equilibria, a result proven by Nicolas Vieille. Our proof uses a state
specific discount factor which is similar to the conventional discount factor
only when there is only one non-absorbing state. Additionally we show that
if the players engage in time homogeneous Markovian behavior relative to
some finite state space of size n then for the existence of an ǫ-equilibrium
it suffices that one-stage deviation brings no more than an ǫ3/(nM) gain to
a player, where M is a bound on the maximal difference between any two
payoffs.
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1 Introduction
A two-player stochastic game is played in stages. At every stage the game
is in some state of the world. Both players are informed of the whole his-
tory, including the current state, and based on this information they choose
simultaneously a pair of actions. The current state and the pair of actions
chosen determine both a stage payoff for each of the players and a probability
distribution according to which a new state is chosen.
For any ǫ ≥ 0, an ǫ-equilibrium in a game is a set of strategies, one
for each player, such that no player can gain in payoff by more than ǫ by
choosing a different strategy, given that all the other players do not change
their strategies. A game has approximate equilibria if for every positive
ǫ > 0 it has an ǫ-equilibrium. The value of a zero-sum game, should one
exist, is the unique cluster point of the ǫ-equilibrium expected payoffs (for
the first player) as ǫ goes to zero. The un-discounted payoff of a player in a
stochatic game with infinitely many stages, when defined, is a limit as the
number of stages goes to infinity of the average summed over the stages of
the player’s expected payoffs. Unless specified, the payoffs of a stochastic
game are undiscounted.
Shapley (1953) presented the model of stochastic games, and proved that
a discounted zero-sum games always have a value obtainable with stationary
optimal strategies. This result was generalized for equilibria in n-player non-
zero-sum discounted games by Fink (1964).
An absorbing state is such that the play never leaves this state once it is
reached. Kohlberg (1974) proved that every two-player zero-sum stochastic
game with only one non-absorbing state has a value. Based on the work of
Bewley and Kohlberg (1976), Mertens and Neyman (1981) generalized this
result, and proved that every zero-sum stochastic game has a value.
A stochastic game is recursive if the stage payoff at all non-absorbing
states is zero, no matter what the players do. A recursive stochastic game is
positive recursive if there is a player who receives at all absorbing states only
positive payoffs. A positive recursive stochastic game is absorbing if the player
who receives these positive payoffs can force the play toward absorption.
Existence of approximate equilibria in two-player non-zero-sum stochas-
tic games with only one non-absorbing state was proven by Thuijsman and
Vrieze (1989). In their proof Thuijsman and Vrieze considered a sequence of
stationary equilibria of the discounted game as the discount factor tends to
1
1, and they constructed different types of ǫ-equilibrium strategies according
to various properties of the sequence.
Vieille (2000a) showed that for approximate equilibria to exist in every
two-player non-zero-sum stochastic game with finitely many states it is suf-
ficient to prove this for the sub-class of absorbing positive recursive games.
Furthermore Vieille (2000b, 2000c) proved that indeed all games in this sub-
class have approximate equilibria.
In the present paper, we provide an alternative proof of the Vieille result
for absorbing positive recursive games. The primarily difference between our
proof and Vieille’s lies in the use of a kind of discount factor rather than
Vieille’s undiscounted evaluation. This discount factor is state specific and
is similar to the conventional discount factor only when there is only one
non-absorbing state. We were inspired by the Thuijsman and Vrieze article
and their confidence that their ideas could deliver the same result for finitely
many states. Our goal was to confirm their optimism by demonstrating the
great versatility of the discounting concept.
In positive recursive games, discount factors for the player receiving pos-
itive absorbing payoffs persuade him to make moves that push the game
toward absorption. Let us call this player the second player. The serious
problem with generalizing the Thuijsman and Vrieze approach directly is
that the usual discounted evaluation does not discriminate between the time
spent at the state at which a decision is made and the other states that might
follow this decision. As long as the second player at a given state chooses
between two moves that do not involve returning to that state, his evaluation
of those moves in an appropriate discounted game should be based upon his
undiscounted evaluation. Play that never returns to this state before ab-
sorption but visits other states arbitrarily many times receives no discount
whereas play that re-visits the initial state n times receives a (1−δ)n discount,
regardless of its visits to other states.
We see no way to generalize our proof to three player games (and it
appears highly unlikely). On the other hand, we can not dismiss the pos-
sibility; (see also Solan, 1999, where discounted evaluations were used to
understand some three player undiscounted stochastic games). If the com-
pactification of a strategy space creates discontinuities in the undiscounted
payoffs a discounted evaluation may handle the points of discontinuity suc-
cessfully. A false impression that discounting is useless to understanding the
undiscounted game may result from a lack of knowledge of how to turn off
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the discount where one is sufficiently far from the points of discontinuity. As
we will see below, knowing when to turn off the discount is central to our
approach.
The secondary difference between our proof and Vieille’s is that the math-
ematics we use is entirely elementary. No deep theorems of mathematics are
required; for example, there is no use of the theory of semi-algebraic func-
tions. What we need from the theory of Markov chains is very elementary and
proved entirely in this paper. Due to our discounting approach we work with
taboo probabilities rather than the directed graphs perspective of Freidlin
and Wentzell, (1984).
The only theorem we quote instead of proving is Doob’s submartingale
inequality, a generalization of Kolmogorov’s inequality and also an easy the-
orem to prove. Applying the inequality, we show that if the players engage
in time homogeneous Markovian behavior relative to some finite state space
of size n then for the existence of an ǫ-equilibrium it suffices that one-stage
deviation brings no more than an ǫ3/nM gain to a player, where M is a
bound on the maximal difference between any two payoffs.
Countably many states
We developed our unorthodox approach to stochastic games with the
hope that it would deliver approximate equilibrium existence for all two-
person non-zero-sum stochastic games with countably many states. We have
failed in this attempt.
The main problem is that our approach (and that of Vieille) rests ulti-
mately on the pideon-hole principle. If the expected number of visits to every
non-absorbing state is finite then with probability one an absorbing state is
reached. This does not hold if there are infinitely many non-absorbing states.
In general, what is the difficulty in proving approximate equilibrium ex-
istence for non-zero-sum two-person stochastic games with countably many
states? Several important positive results need to be mentioned. Maitra
and Sudderth (1991) proved that all zero-sum stochastic games with count-
ably many states have values. In a game of perfect information, the players
take turns making their moves and each player knows the previous moves
of the other players; the classic example is that of chess. A Blackwell game
is identical in transition structure to a stochastic game, but the payoffs are
determined by a function Borel measurable with respect to the histories of
play. Martin (1975) proved that all zero-sum Blackwell games of perfect
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information have values, and Mertens and Neyman (in Mertens 1987) ex-
tended Martin’s result to non-zero-sum games with finitely many players.
Using his result for games of perfect information, Martin (1998) proved that
all zero-sum Blackwell games have values.
The differences between non-zero-sum stochastic games (with simultane-
ous moves) and either non-zero-sum Blackwell games of perfect information
or zero-sum Blackwell games with simultaneous moves are formidable. The
probability of absorption at a stage in a stochastic game can be also a min-
imal bound on that stage’s deviation from pure equilibria; (for example see
the “Big Match” in Blackwell and Ferguson, 1968). With the ǫ-equilibria
of many games, including the absorbing positive recursive variety, while ab-
sorption must become a near certainty the culmulative opportunity to exploit
deviations must not exceed ǫ. Therefore one needs that stage for stage ap-
proximate equilibria can translate to cumulative approximate equilibria. In
zero-sum games this is not so problematic because the gains to one player
from deviation equal the losses to the other player. But with two-person
non-zero-sum games, one must consider functions with values in R2; the po-
tential independence of the two values and need for a cooperative solution
frustrate attempts to generalize the approachs that were successful with zero-
sum games. On the other hand if the moves are made simultaneously how
does one know the other player is adhering to a cooperative agreement? So
far the main answer has been to request from each player Markovian behav-
ior, accompanied by statistical testing and punishment by the other player
in the event of significant statistical deviation. With this approach, it is nec-
essary that the probability that an honest player will be punished unjustly
can be made arbitrarily small. As we will demonstrate with the following
proposition and counter-example to a variation on this proposition, such a
control process is unlikely in general for Markovian behavior that is carried
out essentially on a countable state space.
If S is a finite or countable set let ∆(S) stand for the space of probability
distributions on S. A Markov chain is defined by a finite or countable state
space S and for every s ∈ S and stage i ≥ 0 a probability distribution
psi ∈ ∆(S) governing the distribution on the states at the i + 1st stage,
given that s is the state on the ith stage. It is time homogeneous if psi is
indendendent of the i.
Proposition 4.2: Let X be a finite space. For every x ∈ X let Yx be a
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finite space, with Y := ∪x∈XYx. (In the context of stochastic games, X will
be the state space and Yx will be the set of moves that a player has at the
state x ∈ X .) There are probability transitions (px ∈ ∆(Yx) | x ∈ X) from
X to Y and there are probability transitions (py ∈ ∆(X) | y ∈ Y ) from Y
to X , so that for every starting point x0 ∈ X a time homogeneous Markov
chain on X ∪ Y is defined. On the even stages i = 0, 2, 4, . . . the process is
in X and on the odd stages the process is in Y . Let there be an evaluation
function v : X ∪ Y → R that is harmonic with respect to the transitions
(meaning that a martingale is formed). Let M > 0 be a uniform bound for
the maximal difference between all values of v. For every pair x ∈ X and
y ∈ Yx such that y is reached from x with positive probability (according to
px) the difference between v(y) and v(x) is no more than δ > 0.
Conclusion: If |X| = n, ǫ < 1/2, and δ ≤ ǫ3/Mn then the probability that
there exists an l with
∑l
i=0,2,...(v(yi+1)− v(xi)) ≥ ǫ does not exceed ǫ.
The complexity of the Yx play no role in the proof of Proposition 4.2, and
therefore it could have many generalizations corresponding to variations in
the structure of the Yx.
To emphasize the importance of the finite number |X|, the following is
a counter-example to Proposition 4.2 if we assume that the bound for δ is
independent of the cardinality of X . Furthermore, if we consider processes
that are not time-homogeneous, it does not help if for every stage the sum
over the states of the maximal differences add up to no more than δ.
Consider a random walk on n + 1 positions such that at the left end (at
position 0) the player receives an absorbing payoff of 0 and on the right end
(at position n) an absorbing payoff of 1. The space X is the n+ 1 positions
and for every x ∈ X the two-set Yx consists of the two directions “left” and
“right”. Given any small δ > 0, one can make n large enough so that at every
stage the change in expected payoff does not exceed δ. Now reformulate the
randon walk so that at the kth stage of play there is no motion at any i
position with i 6= k (mod n−1), but at the k′ = k (mod n−1) position there
is an equal 1/2 probability of moving either to the position k′−1 or to k′+1.
At each stage the sum over the states of the differences in expected payoffs
remains no more than δ, and yet we are no closer to satisfying the conclusion
of the proposition. (With n even and starting in the middle position with
an expected payoff of 1/2, for every small positive ǫ with probability close
to 1/2 there will be motion to a position with an expected payoff of at least
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1/2 + 2ǫ.)
We expect no proof of approximate equilibrium existence for all non-
zero-sum stochastic games with countable state spaces without a radically
different approach. If a proof for countably many states can be found, its
application to finite state truncations of the countable state game would pro-
vide approximate equilibria of the finite state games such that the average
number of stages before absorption would not explode with the increase in
the finite number of these states. In the proof below for a fixed ǫ there is
no lower bound determined by the number of states on the rate for which
an absorbing state is reached. Indeed, because such a proof would imply the
existence of yet another alternative proof for finitely many states with dra-
matic absorption rate properties, we suspect that there is a counter-example.
Furthermore, it is possible that the complexities from countably many states
involved in a two-player counter-example could be mimicked by the introduc-
tion of more players in a stochastic game with finitely many states, yielding
a counter-example to approximate equilibria in this context as well.
We suspect that approximate equilibrium existence for a broad class of
two-person stochastic games played on countable state spaces must rest on
a fundamental assumption: that there is a uniform bound on the number
of states possible on any given stage of play. With a finite number of such
positions, it is still not clear how appropriate Markovian should be found.
Even with only one non-absorbing position, the possible infinite variations,
including the number of moves for each player and the order in which similar
“types” may appear, make the problem formidable. At least the generaliza-
tion of Lemma 4.1 to Markov chains that are not time homogeneous will be
necessary. Another reason to present our alternative proof of the Vieille re-
sult is the hope that it will be relevant to this case, which we call the case of
finitely many positions. If for each non-absorbing position one could find an
appropriate common identity to an infinite sub-sequence of states occuring
in that position, then the pideon hole principle could be applied successfully.
Throughout this paper, we comment on the case of finitely many positions.
Organization
To execute our proof efficiently, we will assume that Player One has the
ability to send signals to Player Two that are independent of the transitions in
the games. The easiest way to formalize this property is to assume that every
move of Player One at a non-absorbing state is paired with another move
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at the same state that is its identical copy with respect to the transitions.
Without this assumption, the proof is formality more involved, less elegant,
however essentially equivalent. In the section following the conclusion of the
main proof, we prove the result without this signaling assumption.
The argument and the paper are organized as follows.
Section 2 introduces the model of absorbing positive recursive stochastic
games and the basic concepts of Markov chains. Additionally we introduce
an important concept with regard to the movement between states, called
taboo probabilities. A taboo probability is the probability that one moves
from an initial state to some set of target states without travelling through
some second set of “forbidden” states.
Section 3 gives proofs of all the needed lemmas on Markov chains. The
most central lemma is Lemma 3.2; it states that when motions at a multitude
of states are removed whose frequencies are only a small fraction of the total
motion toward a fixed state then the flow continues toward this fixed state
with about the same or greater tendency.
Section 4 contains a proof of Proposition 4.2, which also establishes gen-
eral sufficient conditions for the existence of approximate equilibria. We
create new states from our old states, which we call situations; at most three
situations are created from each original state. The method of creating the
situations we call polarization, introduced in Section 3. Except for the rare
possibility of punishment, our behavior strategies will be stationary on the
situations. Section 4 concludes with Theorem 1, a demonstration of sufficient
conditions for approximate equilibrium existence in our games.
In Section 5 we introduce the state specific discounted evaluation for the
second player. We define the discounted evaluation such that the discounting
rates are adjusted for states sufficiently close together, according to a metric
determined by the strategies. We select a quantity ǫ much smaller than
ǫ, and define the discounted evaluation so that moves with more than an
ǫ probability of non-return to the state are evaluated in an undiscounted
way and moves with a γ probability of no return with γ < ǫ are evaluated
as if their probability of no return was γ/ǫ. Our choice for ǫ is guided by
Proposition 4.2.
A serious problem with the state specific discounted evaluation is that
the motivations of the second player at one state can be very different from
that at another state. Essentially the second player becomes a multitude of
players, one for each state. This allows for the second player at some states to
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prefer moves that result in too slow a motion toward absorption and there-
fore also discounted evaluations below the zero-sum value. To avoid this
problem, in Section 2 we define a new correspondence, called the “jump”
correspondence, based upon stationary strategies optimal in the convention-
ally discounted game. The use of the jump correspondence by the second
player results in fast absorption. The “best-reply” correspondence of the sec-
ond player is a combination of the jump correspondence with a maximization
of the state specific discounted evaluation – when the discounted evaluation
is too low, the jump correspondence is activated. For the first player, the
undiscounted evaluation is used to define her “best-reply” correspondence.
With the “best-reply” correspondences for both player defined, we demon-
strate two important properties. Lemma 5.4 shows that at a fixed point the
jump correspondence of the second player has only very limited influence on
the play. Lemma 5.5 contains the key argument to our entire approach; it is
used repeatedly to solve the most difficult problems. It shows that if there
is a meaningful discrepancy between the discounted and undiscounted eval-
uations for the second player then the second player seeks primarily motion
with the fastest absorption rate.
The synthesis of the previous sections lies in Section 6. Theorem 2 proves
that the conditions of Theorem 1 are always satisfied – implying the exis-
tence of approximate equilibria. Here we consider sets such that a significant
proportion of all the motion leaving these sets are from Player Two moves
with payoffs for Player Two significantly below the set-average payoff. Fix-
ing any such state in a set where such moves take place, we look at what
happens when Player One stops playing all moves performed with frequen-
cies small compared to the motion toward this special state. The result, for
which Player One is indifferent, involves almost exclusively the use of similar
such moves by Player Two such that the players can travel between these
moves without the danger that along the way Player Two prefers to provoke
punishment over performing one of these moves. Ultimately we show that
there is a convex combination of such moves that all yield the same payoff
for Player Two and for which Player One is approximately indifferent.
In Section 7 we consider the problem of signaling, as described above;
and in Section 8 we conclude in more detail with the problem of countably
many states.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Model
Let S be the set of states; A is the subset of absorbing states and N = S\A
is the subset of non-absorbing states.
For every s ∈ S, As1 and A
s
2 are the moves (pure actions) of the first
and second players, respectively, at the state s. Without loss of generality,
we assume that |Asi | = 1 for every s ∈ A and i = 1, 2. Let r
1 : A →
[−1/2, 1/2] and r2 : A → [ω, 1] be the first and second players’ evaluations
on absorbing states, respectively, with 0 < ω < 1. Let m be the maximal
number of moves for either player at any non-absorbing state, meaning m =
maxs∈N (|As1|, |A
s
2|).
Let p(t|s; a, b) be the probability of moving from s to t when a ∈ As1
and b ∈ As2 are played. Let ρ be defined by ρ := min(p(t|s; a, b) | s, t ∈
S p(t|s; a, b) > 0), the minimal non-zero transition probability. Notice that
in the case of finitely many positions one has such a positive quantity for each
stage. More relevant, however, would be a sequence ρi of positive quantities
such that the series ρi is divergent but sums toward infinity much slower
than any divergent series of positive transition probabilities. Such a series is
possible if there is a uniform bound on the number of moves. Additionally the
discount factor must be adjusted to this series, (possibly with the discount
factor equaling 1− δρi if there is only one non-absorbing state).
Let X :=
∏
s∈N ∆(A
s
1) and Y :=
∏
s∈N ∆(A
s
2) be the spaces of stationary
strategies of the players, with Xs := ∆(As1) and Y
s := ∆(As2). For a ∈
As1, b ∈ A
s
2, x
s ∈ Xs and ys ∈ Y s we define p(t|s; a, ys), p(t|s; xs, b) and
p(t|s; xs, ys) in the appropriate linear or bi-linear way. For any s ∈ N ,
xs ∈ Xs and a ∈ As1, the quantity x
s
a will stand for the probability, as
determined by xs, that the move a is used. The same applies for b ∈ As2,
ys ∈ Y s and ysb . Define a pair (x, y) ∈ X × Y to be absorbing if from every
start with probability one an absorbing state is reached.
We will say that two positive quantities a and b are different by no more
than a factor of positive γ < 1 if a ≥ b(1 − γ) and b ≥ a(1− γ).
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2.2 Histories, Strategies, Equilibria
For every stage i ≥ 0 and s ∈ S define Hsi := {(s0, a0, b0), (s1, a1, b1), . . . ,
(si−1, ai−1, bi−1), si = s | ∀ 0 ≤ k < i ak ∈ A
sk
1 , bk ∈ A
sk
2 , p(sk+1|sk; ak, bk) >
0}, with Hs0 = {s} for all s ∈ S. Define H
s := ∪∞i=1H
s
i , Hi := ∪s∈SH
s
i ,
H := ∪i=0Hi, and H˜ := {(s0, a0, b0), (s1, a1, b1), . . . | ∀i ≥ 0 the truncation
up to si belongs to H
si
i }, the set of infinite sequences.
A strategy of Player j = 1, 2 is a set of maps σj = (σ
s
j | s ∈ N ) with σ
s
j
a map from Hs to ∆(Asj) for all s ∈ N .
With Blackwell games, a more general class than stochastic games, we
assume that a player’s evaluation on H˜ is a function that is measurable
with respect to the Borel subsets of H˜, the sigma algebra induced by the
subsets of Hi for all i ≥ 0. In case that a stochastic game is recursive, for
every member of H˜ it easy to define an evaluation for both players. Either
the infinite sequence reaches an absorbing state and the players receive the
corresponding absorbing payoffs, or it never reaches an absorbing state and
both players receive a payoff of zero.
For every initial state s and every pair of strategies σ1, σ2 for both players
a distribution is induced on H˜ in a natural way, resulting in two evaluations
Vsj (σ1, σ2) for Player j = 1, 2 of the expected values of the r
j on H˜. An ǫ-
equilibrium is a pair σ1, σ2 such that for all s ∈ S and alternative strategies σ˜1
and σ˜2 it holds that Vs1(σ˜1, σ2) ≤ V
s
1(σ1, σ2)+ǫ and V
s
2(σ1, σ˜2) ≤ V
s
2(σ1, σ2)+ǫ.
With absorbing positive recursive games and positive ω the lowest Player Two
absorbing payoff we get the additional property that there exists an N > 0
such that with probability at least 1− 2ǫ
ω
the game has reached an absorbing
state before the stage N .
2.3 Jump Function
For any positive real number 0 < α < 1 let Gα be the conventionally defined
discounted zero-sum game played against Player Two such that a visit to
any state is discounted according to 1 − α, and let G0 be the corresponding
undiscounted zero-sum game. For all positive α we define cα : S → R
to be the min-max value for Player Two in the zero-sum game Gα, with
cα(s) = r2(s) for all s ∈ A. Because the game is positive recursive the cα are
monotonically non-decreasing and due to Mertens and Neyman (1981) the
point-wise limit is the undiscounted value of the game G0, though for this
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class of games there is an elementary proof. Player Two chooses a stationary
optimal strategy of Gα for an α > 0 sufficiently small so that cα is within ǫ
of its point-wise limit and at stage i Player One chooses one of her optimal
strategies in the game Gαi where for every i ≥ 0 cαi is within ǫ/2i+2 of the
point-wise limit and αi < ǫ/2
i+2.
For every x ∈ X and positive 0 < α < 1 define the jump function
jαx : N → R by
jαx (s) = (1− α)max
b∈As2
∑
t∈S
p(t|s, x, b) cα(t)
– the maximal payoff that Player Two can guarantee himself in the 1 − α
discounted game by being punished after the next stage if Player One uses x
at the present stage. If s is an absorbing state, define jα(s) to be r2(s) for all
α. For all states it is clear that jαx ≥ c
α, with equality when x is an optimal
strategy for Player One in the zero-sum game Gα played against Player Two.
For every state s ∈ N and x ∈ X define
Jαx (s) = argmaxb∈As2
∑
t∈S
p(t|s, x, b) cα(t).
Let n(s) denote the state following s, in our context a random variable. If
s is not an absorbing state and b ∈ Jαx (s) then j
α
x (s) ≤ (1 − α)E
x
b j
α
x (n(s)),
where Exb is the expectation determined by the move b and the strategy x
s.
This makes jαx a sub-martingale.
For i = 1, 2 and a state s ∈ S define ci(s) to be the value for Player i of
the zero-sum undiscounted game played against Player i starting at the state
s. For every Player i and every stationary strategy z of Player k 6= i define
the jump function jiz : S → R by
j2z (s) = max
b∈As2
∑
t∈S
p(t|s, z, b)c2(t) or j
1
z (s) = max
a∈As1
∑
t∈S
p(t|s, a, z)c1(t)
– the maximal payoff that Player i can guarantee himself against z if he is
punished on the next stage.
2.4 Taboo probabilities
For any time homogeneous Markov chain, a state s, and two disjoint sets
A and B of states we introduce the “taboo” probability PA(s, B) to be the
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probability, with a start at the state s, of reaching the set B before the set A
at any stage following the initial stage at s. With tC := inf{n ≥ 1 | sn ∈ C}
PA(s, B) measures the event that tB <∞ and tB < tA conditioned on s0 = s.
If either set is a singleton, we can write its single member instead of the
set. If there is ambiguity concerning which state space or which transitions,
we identify them with a subscript. In our context of stochastic games and
stationary strategies, PAx,y(s, B) will be the taboo probability corresponding
to the time homogeneous Markov chain generated by (x, y) ∈ X × Y .
Define a state of a time homogeneous Markov chain to be absorbing if
once this state is reached then the motion remains in this state forever. The
Markov chain is absorbing if for any start with probability one an absorbing
state is reached.
Before moving toward the proof, we must present some basic notions
using the taboo probabilities. These quantities will be defined first for time
homogeneous Markov chains and then applied to the games.
For any part p of a transition at a state s or an alternative transition p
for that state define g(p) to be the probability that there is no return to s if
p is used at s and the transitions remain constant at all other states. If p was
a part of the transition at s then define fp to be the frequency with which
p is used at the state s. For every choice (x, y) ∈ X × Y and pair a ∈ As1
and b ∈ As2 of moves at the state s ∈ N gx,y(a, b) is the probability that
there is no return to s given that Player One and Player Two at s play the
actions a and b, and elsewhere in the future the stationary strategies (x, y).
For a move b ∈ As2 of the second player, define g
b
x,y to be
∑
a∈As1
xsag(a, b), and
define gax,y for all a ∈ A
s
1 correspondingly.
Define the absorption rate a(s) of a state s to be the probability that
after any visit to this state there is no return to this state, meaning that the
absorption rate is the expected value of the function g. For the game the
absorption rate ax,y(s) of a state s is
∑
a∈As1, b∈A
s
2
xsay
s
bg
s
x,y(a, b). Given that
(x, y) is absorbing ax,y(s) would be the taboo probability P
s
x,y(s,A).
For any part p of the transition at a state s define ν(p) to be the proba-
bility that at the last visit to s the part p was used, or equivalently ν(p) =
fpg(p)/a(s). We call this the importance of p. For a pair of moves a ∈ As1 and
b ∈ As2 at s ∈ N and stationary strategies (x, y) the importance ν
s
x,y(a, b) is
xsay
s
bgx,y(a, b)/ax,y(s). For any move a ∈ A
s
1 define ν
a
x,y to be
∑
b∈A2 νx,y(a, b) =
xag
a
x,y/ax,y(s) and for any move b ∈ A
s
2 define ν
b
x,y in the same way.
For any distinct pair s, t of states define esc(t, s) to be the probability of
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never reaching s with a start at t. (esc stands for “escape”.) For the game we
have gbx,y =
∑
t∈S p(t|s; x, b)escx,y(t, s). (If (x, y) is absorbing, escx,y(t, s) is
P sx,y(t,A) and is different from P
s,t
x,y(t,A), the probability of absorbing before
returning to either s or t).
For distinct states s and t let µ(s, t) be esc(s, t)+ esc(t, s), and otherwise
let µ(s, s) = 0. µ is a metric on the state space. Recognize 1 − esc(t, s) as
the probability of moving from t to s, and for mutually distinct u, v, w we
have 1− esc(u, w) ≥ (1− esc(u, v))(1− esc(v, w)) ≥ 1− esc(u, v)− esc(v, w).
Given that the Markov chain is absorbing with A the set of absorbing
states, the following relations for states s 6= t are easy to verify:
esc(s, t) =
P {s,t}(s, A)
P s(s, t) + P {s,t}(s, A)
=
P {s,t}(s, A)
1− PA∪{t}(s, s)
(1)
a(s) = P s(s, t)esc(t, s) + P {s,t}(s, A) (2)
which imply P s(s, t)µ(s, t) ≤ a(s) ≤ µ(s, t) and a(t)P s(s, t) ≤ a(s) (3).
For all these quantities and following ones, we can drop the subscripts
and superscripts if there is no ambiguity.
2.5 Evaluations
We had extended the values ri : A → R on the absorbing states to functions
ri on all paths in H˜. For any stationary strategies (x, y) and players i = 1, 2
extend the definition of ri again to a harmonic function rix,y : S → R with
rix,y(s) equal to the expected value of r
i on H˜ as determined by (x, y).
For any harmonic function r on S, and p a part of or an alternative
to the transition from a state s, define vr(p) to be the expected value of r
conditioned on the use of p and no return to the state s, with vr(p) defined to
be r(s) if there is return to s with certainty. If the Markov chain is absorbing
and g(p) > 0 then vr(p) would be the new harmonic function value for s if
the transition from s were replaced by p. For every pair of moves a ∈ As1 and
b ∈ As2 v
i
x,y(a, b) is defined to be v
rix,y of the part of the transition defined by
the pair (a, b) of moves. Likewise define vix,y(a) and v
i
x,y(b) with respect to
the pairs (a, y ∈ Y s) and (x ∈ Xs, b), respectively. If (x, y) is absorbing we
have the relation
rix,y(s) =
∑
a,b x
s
ay
s
bv
i
x,y(a, b)g
s
x,y(a, b)
ax,y(s)
=
∑
a,b
νx,y(a, b)v
i
x,y(a, b).
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For a ∈ As1 we have
vix,y(a) :=
∑
b∈As2
ysbv
i
x,y(a, b)gx,y(a, b)/g
a
x,y =
∑
b νx,y(a, b)v
i
x,y(a, b)/ν
a
x,y
and for b ∈ As2 we have
vix,y(b) :=
∑
a∈As1
xsav
i
x,y(a, b)gx,y(a, b)/g
b
x,y =
∑
a νx,y(a, b)v
i
x,y(a, b)/ν
b
x,y,
with both quantities ri(s) when the quotient is not well defined.
For any harmonic function r on S, and p, a part of or an alternative to
the transition from a state s, define wr(p) to be the expected value of r on
the following stage according to the one-time use of p on that stage. We
have wr(p) = g(p)vr(p) + (1 − g(p))r(s). For any pair of moves a ∈ As1 and
b ∈ As2 at s ∈ N and i = 1, 2 w
i
x,y(a, b) is the expected value of r
i
x,y on
the next stage if the players use the pair a and b on the present stage at s.
For all b ∈ As2 define w
i
x,y(b) :=
∑
a∈As1
xsaw
i
x,y(a, b) and for all a ∈ A
s
1 define
wix,y(a) :=
∑
b∈As2
ysaw
i
x,y(a, b).
The following is a central lemma concerning the changes in a harmonic
function.
Lemma 2.1: Let S be the finite state space of an absorbing time ho-
mogeneous Markov chain and r : S → R a harmonic function. For ev-
ery non-absorbing s ∈ S let ps be an alternative transition at s such that
g(ps) > 0. Define a new time homogeneous Markov chain according to the
ps. Let a∗ : S → [0, 1] be the absorbing rates corresponding to the new time
homogeneous Markov chain and let r∗ : S → R be a harmonic function with
respect to the new transitions such that r∗ agrees with r on the absorbing
states. If |vr(ps) − r(s)| ≤ δs and a∗(s) ≥ ǫsg(ps) for 0 < ǫs ≤ 1 and all
non-absorbing s ∈ S (with g(ps) = a(s) if ps was the original transition at s)
then the new Markov chain is absorbing and |r∗(s)− r(s)| ≤
∑
t δt/ǫt for all
states s.
Proof: The new Markov chain is absorbing because a∗(s) > 0 for all
s ∈ S. With a start at any state s0, we can bound the change |r∗(s0)− r(s0)|
by the sum over all states t ∈ S of the one stage deviation at t multiplied by
the expected number of visits to the state t. The deviation from one visit to a
state t is bounded by |wr(pt)−r(t)|, and since 1/a∗(t) is the expected number
of visits to the state t we have the total deviation bounded by
∑
t
|wr(pt)−r(t)|
a∗(t)
.
|wr(pt)− r(t)| ≤ g(pt)|vr(pt)− r(t)| implies |wr(pt)− r(t)|/a∗(t) ≤ |vr(pt)−
r(t)|/ǫt. ✷
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3 Changes in Taboo Probabilities
In all the lematta of this section, S is a finite state space of a time homoge-
neous Markov chain.
3.1 Reaching a State
For the first three lemmatta we look at what happens when a fraction of
P t(t, s) is removed from the transitions at all t in a set T .
Lemma 3.1 Let s and t be two distinct states and A and B two subsets of
states such that A, B and {s, t} are mutually disjoint. Let p be a part of the
transition at t such that at least positive γ < 1 of the transition PB∪{t}(t, A)
goes through p (meaning that if the complement of p were removed and
replaced by motion that went back to t on the next stage with certainty then
the new quantity for PB∪{t}(t, A) would be at least γ times the old quantity).
If the existing transition at t were replaced by p (followed by normalization)
and the new transitions were indexed by ∗ then PB∪{t}∗ (t, A) ≥ γPB∪{t}(t, A)
and P
B∪{s}
∗ (s, A) ≥ γPB∪{s}(s, A).
Proof: P
B∪{t}
∗ (t, A) ≥ γPB∪{t}(t, A) is given. If there was never motion
from s to t or from t to s then the inequality P
B∪{s}
∗ (s, A) ≥ γPB∪{s}(s, A)
would also be straightforward. So let us assume that there is some motion
in both directions between s and t, and let A′ be the set A unioned with all
the other states from which there is no motion to either s or t.
To estimate P
B∪{s}
∗ (s, A) let b := PB∪{s,t}(s, A), c := PB∪A
′∪{s}(s, t),
d := PB∪A
′∪{t}(t, s) and e = PB∪{s,t}(t, A). Let d∗ and e∗ stand for the
contributions to d and e made by the transitions in p, so that d∗ ≤ d and
e∗ ≤ e. By assumption we have e∗ + d∗
b
b+c
≥ γ(e + d b
b+c
). We suppose for
the sake of contradiction that γP s(s, A) = γ(b+ ce
d+e
) > b+ ce∗
d∗+e∗
= P s∗ (s, A).
Re-write as (d∗+e∗)(be∗+bd∗+ce∗) > (be∗+bd∗+ce∗)(d+e) or d∗+e∗ > d+e,
a contradiction. ✷
Lemma 3.2: Let T and A ∪ U be mutually disjoint subsets of S. If
no more than a frequency of γP T∪{u}(u,A) is removed from the transitions
of all u ∈ U\A for some fraction 0 < γ < 1/(2|U |) and no more than
a frequency of γ in the case of u ∈ U ∩ A, followed by normalization,
then for all x ∈ S\A the new resulting probabilities P T∪{x}∗ (x,A) satisfy
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P
T∪{x}
∗ (x,A) ≥ (1− γ|U |)P T∪{x}(x,A) and for every a ∈ A and x 6∈ A∪ T
(1− 3|U |γ)P T∪A∗ (a, x) ≤ P
T∪A(a, x).
Proof: For U = ∅ there is nothing to prove. Now assume the result for
U\{u}, and let P+ stand for the probabilities where the changes are made in
U\{u}. Since by induction P T∪{u}+ (u,A) ≥ (1 − γ|U | + γ)P
T∪{u}(u,A), the
frequency removal at u is no more than γ
1−γ|U |+γ
P
T∪{u}
+ (u,A). By Lemma 3.1
applied to the case of only one change at u, we have for all x P
T∪{u}
∗ (x,A) ≥
(1 − γ
(1−γ|U |+γ)
)P
T∪{x}
+ (x,A) ≥ (1 −
γ
1−γ|U |+γ
)(1 − γ|U | + γ))P T∪{x}(x,A) =
(1− γ|U |)P T∪{x}(x,A).
For the second half, if u ∈ A then it follows by induction because the
only way to increase this probability is through the normalization. Oth-
erwise express P T∪A∗ (a, x) as P
T∪A∪{u}
∗ (a, x) +
P
T∪A∪{x}
∗ (a,u)P
T∪A∪{u}
∗ (u,x)
1−P
T∪A∪{x}
∗ (u,u)
. We
notice that 1 − P T∪A∪{x}∗ (u, u) ≥ P u∗ (u, T ∪ A ∪ {x}) ≥ P
T∪{u}
∗ (u,A), so
that the change 1 − P T∪A∪{x}+ (u, u) to 1 − P
T∪A∪{x}
∗ (u, u) cannot be a de-
crease by more than a factor of γ/(1 − γ|U | + γ) ≤ 2γ. The rest follows by
(1− γ)P T∪A∪{u}∗ (u, x) ≤ P
T∪A∪{u}
+ (u, x), (since the only way to increase this
probability is through the normalization). ✷
Lemma 3.3 Let T be a subset of S and let s be a fixed state such that s is
reached with positive probability from every t ∈ T . For every t ∈ T let qt be
a part of the transition at the state t satisfying fqtP
t
qt(t, s) ≤ γP
t(t, s) where
P tqt(t, s) is the resulting taboo probability if q
t is a replacement transition at
t. Consider new transitions resulting from the removal of the part qt at every
t ∈ T , followed by normalization. If |T |γ < 1 then s is also reached with
positive probability from all of T after the changes.
Proof: We prove by induction on the size of T ; by Lemma 3.1 the claim
holds for |T | = 1. With v ∈ T also fixed, let us assume that there is some
state u ∈ T such that after the changes from a start at v the state u is not
reached at all. Whether or not one reaches s from v with the changes cannot
not be influenced by any change made at u. Therefore by the induction
hypothesis, considering changes made in the smaller set T\{u}, we have our
result.
Now assume that with the changes all member of T are reached from v.
For every pair t, u ∈ T let wt(u) be the probability in the original Markov
chain with respect to a start at t that s is reached and that the last visit to a
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state in T was at the state u. Because starting at t rather than at u cannot
be a better way to reach s through the state u, we have wt(u) ≤ wu(u). But
then there must be a u ∈ T such that wu(u) ≥
1
|T |
∑
twt(t) ≥
1
|T |
∑
twu(t).
This means that at least 1|T | of the original motion P
u(u, s) went directly to
s without passing through any other member of T (and therefore after the
changes there is still motion from u to s). ✷
The following lemma concerns transitions in two person stochastic games,
but can be generalized to any time homogeneous Markov Chain whose tran-
sitions are determined by two independent variables.
Lemma 3.4 Let R be a subset of non-absorbing states, U a subset of
R, and (x, y) a pair of stationary strategies such that there is some motion
between all pairs of states in R. Let s, t ∈ U be special states. Assume
for every u ∈ U\{s} that no more than a frequency of γP u(u, s) is removed
from xu ∈ Xu and no more than a frequency of γ from xs, followed by
normalization; let x stand for the result. Assume for the state t ∈ U that
P sx,y(s, t) ≥ ǫP
s
x,y(s, t). Let y
u
∗ be a part of y
u for any u ∈ U with fu∗ its
frequency. Assume for all u ∈ U and both z ∈ {s, t} that fu∗ P
u
x,(y|yu∗ )
(u, z) ≤
δP ux,y(u, z) where (y|y
u
∗ ) is the strategy that is y
v when v 6= u and is yu∗
otherwise. Let y stand for the result when yu∗ is removed from y
u for every
u ∈ U , followed by normalization. Given that (1−4γ|U |)ǫ > δ|U | with (x, y)
there is some motion from all states in R to s and also some motion from s
to t.
Proof: Since the part of P ux,y(u, s) that was removed cannot exceed δ+γ
of the whole, we have from Lemma 3.3 that s is reached from all states v in
R.
As with the proof of Lemma 3.3 we can assume by induction that all
u ∈ U\{t} are reached from s with x and y. We account for P sx,y(s, t) by
considering the last state visited on the way from s to t. For any choice of
(x˜, y˜) let px˜,y˜(u, t) := P
U
x˜,y˜(u, t) be the probability of moving from u to t with
no other member of U in between. Let U ′ := U\{s, t}. We have
P sx˜,y˜(s, t) = px˜,y˜(s, t) +
∑
u∈U ′
px˜,y˜(u, t)P
{t,s}
x˜,y˜ (s, u)
1− P {s,t,u}x˜,y˜ (u, u)
,
since
P
{t,s}
x˜,y˜
(s,u)
1−P
{s,t,u}
x˜,y˜
(u,u)
is the expected number of times that u is visited before
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reaching t or returning to s, with 1 − P {s,t,u}(u, u) = P u(u, {s, t} ∪ A) ≥
P u(u, s), where A is the set from which there is no motion to the set R.
Define for all u ∈ U ′ e(u) :=
P
{t,s}
x,y (s,u)
1−P s,t,ux,y (u,u)
, with e(s) = 1, and define e∗(u)
correspondingly with respect to x and y, with e∗(s) = 1. By Lemma 3.2 we
have (1− 4γ(|U | − 2))e∗(u) ≤ e(u) for all u ∈ U ′. We can conclude that∑
u∈U\{t}
e(u)px,y(u, t) ≥ (1− 4(|U | − 1)γ)P
s
x,y(s, t) ≥
ǫ(1−4(|U |−1)γ)P sx,y(s, t) = ǫ(1−4(|U |−1)γ)
∑
u∈U\{t}
e(u)px,y(u, t). (4)
Next define px,y(u, t) := P
U
x,y(u, t). By recognizing that px,y(u, t)e(u)/P
s(s, t),
the probability that the last visit to U was at u ∈ U from a start at s, is less
than or equal to the probability that the last visit to U was u with a start at
u (both according to (x, y)), we have from the defining condition on y that
|px,y(u, t)e(u)− px,y(u, t)e(u)| ≤ δP
s(s, t). After summing over U\{t} we get
∑
u∈U\{t}
e(u)px,y(u, t) ≥ (1− δ|U | + δ)
∑
u∈U\{t}
e(u)px,y(u, t) (5).
To show that u reaches t for some u ∈ U\{t}, it suffices to show that
px,y(u, t) + px,y(u, t) > px,y(u, t) for some u ∈ U\{t}. But assuming that
px,y(u, t)+px,y(u, t) ≤ px,y(u, t) for all u ∈ U\{t}, from the above sums in (4)
and (5) we must conclude that 1 − δ|U | + ǫ(1 − 4γ|U |) < 1, a contradiction
to the initial assumption. ✷
3.2 Continuity and Exiting
Because of the unlimited number of stages, taboo probabilities and harmonic
functions of time homogeneous Markov chains are not continuous with re-
spect to absolute changes in transition probabilities. However, there is a con-
tinuity for relative changes in these transitions. A result of the same spirit
but in a different formal context is contained in Freidlin and and Wentzell
(1984).
Lemma 3.5 Assume that the transitions ps ∈ ∆(S) at a subset U are
changed such that for all t ∈ S, including s = t, the resulting ps∗(t) differs
from ps(t) by no more than a factor of positive γ < 1/(2|U |) (necessarily
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with ps∗(t) = 0 if and only if p
s(t) = 0). Let P T∗ (s, A) stand for the resulting
taboo probability. For all choices of s, T , and A with T ∩ A = ∅, P T (s, A)
differs from P T∗ (s, A) by a factor of at most 4γ|U |. If the original Markov is
absorbing then the resulting Markov chain is absorbing and if r : S → R is
a harmonic function with respect to the original Markov chain and r∗ is the
resulting harmonic function that agrees with r on all the absorbing states
then |r(s) − r∗(s)| ≤ 4γ|U |M for every s ∈ S, where M is a bound on the
difference between the function values of r on these absorbing states.
Proof: Let U := {s1, . . . , sN}. Let P Ti (s, A) stand for the taboo prob-
ability when the changes are made only at the subset {s1, s2, . . . , si}, and
define esci(t, s) in the same way.
First we claim that for every fixed choice of s, T, A with s ∈ T that
P Ti (s, A) and P
T
i−1(s, A) differ at most by a factor of 2γ. Since both P
T
i (si, A)
and P Ti−1(si, A) are expectations over the next stage of some probabilities, we
have our claim for P Ti (si, A) and a factor of γ by the defining assumption.
If s 6= si then we get our result from the same observation and the formula
P Ti (s, A) = P
T∪{si}
i (s, A) +P
T
i (s, si)P
T∪{s,si}
i (si, A)/P
si
i (si, T ∪B ∪A∪ {s}),
where B is the set of states such that in either the ith or i + 1st Markov
chain there is no motion to the state si from the set B.
From formula (1) we have 1−escN(t, s) = P sN(s, t)/(P
s
N(s, t)+P
{s,t}
N (s, B))
and from above that 1− escN(t, s) does not differ from 1− esc(t, s) by more
than a factor of 2γN . Notice that 1 − a(s) can be written as the expected
value of 1− esc(t, s) on the next stage, and therefore 1− a(s) does not differ
from 1 − aN (s) by more than a factor of 2γN , where aN is the resulting
absorption rate. This implies that a(s) = 1 if and only if aN (s) = 1 and
in this case we have P TN (s, A) = P
T∪{s}
N (s, A), P
T (s, A) = P T∪{s}(s, A), and
our result. Given a(s) 6= 1 then by P T (s, A) = P T∪{s}(s, A)/(1 − a(s)) and
P TN (s, A) = P
T∪{s}
N (s, A)/(1 − aN(s)) we also have our result. The claim
concerning harmonic functions follows by considering A to be any subset of
absorbing states. ✷
Next we define the concept of exit. (Due to the lack of the semi-algebraic
analysis, we will be more restrictive in our definition of an exit than Vieille
2000a or Solan 2000.) For any subset P of non-absorbing states a system
of exits from P is a collection of parts of the transitions at the states in P
such that all motion from P to S\P must occur through one of these parts.
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Each part in the collection is called an exit. Given that the Markov chain is
absorbing any subset of non-absorbing states must have a system of exits.
Assume that there is a partition P of the states such that {s} is in P
for every absorbing s and for every non-absorbing s ∈ P ∈ P qs ∈ ∆(S)
is the transition defined conditionally by the union of all the exits from P
at the state s. Let A be the set of absorbing states. For every P ∈ P let
sP ∈ P be a representatative for the set P . We will create two new time
homogeneous Markov processes, one by extending the state space and the
other by contracting it. These constructions are also in Vieille (2000c).
First we extend the state space. For every s ∈ P ∈ P, create two new
states sa and sb. Define S∗ := {sa | s ∈ A} ∪s∈S\A {sa, sb}, and the cor-
responding Markov chain will be indexed by ∗. The states {sa | s ∈ A}
remain absorbing. At sa with s ∈ P ∈ P, the motion goes deterministically
to sbP . At s
b the transition is labeled ps
b
∗ ∈ ∆(S∗). Let fs be frequency
with which qs is used. Let ps be the transition defined by ps conditioned
on the non-use of qs, given of course that fs 6= 1. Define ps
b
∗ (t
a) = fsq
s(t)
and ps
b
∗ (t
b) = (1 − fs)ps(t) (and otherwise zero if ps is not defined), with
ps
b
∗ (a) = p
s(a) if a ∈ A.
Given that the Markov chain is absorbing, next we contract the state
space. Define S♯ = {sP | P ∈ P}. A previously absorbing state remains
absorbing. For every non-absorbing state sP let the transition at sP be
induced by the distribution on the next state ta following sbP in the above
Markov chain defined on S∗. If t
a is absorbing, then t is that next state.
If ta is not absorbing, the u = uP ′ is the next state with t ∈ P ′ ∈ P.
Since the Markov chain on S∗ is absorbing, modulo events of zero probability
the transitions of S♯ are well defined. In a different context (without taboo
probabilities) a similar statement to the next lemma was proven by Vieille
(2000c).
Lemma 3.6: Assume that the Markov chain is absorbing. Let r be a
harmonic function on S and M > 0 a uniform bound on all differences in the
values of r. Let N be the number of the P that are not singletons, and let
0 < δ < 1
2N
be given. Assume for every P ∈ P and every distinct pair s, t ∈ P
that the probability of moving from t to s without passing through any exit
of P is at least 1− δ. The new processes on S∗ and S♯ are absorbing and for
any pair of subsets A and T that are unions of members of P with A∩T = ∅
we have that PA∗∗ (s, T∗) differs from P
A(s, T ) by no more than a factor of
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4Nδ, where B∗ := {sa, sb | s ∈ B} for all subsets B. With r∗ representing
the new harmonic function on S∗ determined by the expected value of r on
the absorbing states and r♯ the same for S♯ we have r∗(s
a
R) = r♯(sR) for all
representative states sR and |r∗(sa)− r(s)| ≤ 4MNδ for all s ∈ S.
Proof: Define two new transitions (pˆs | s ∈ S) and (ps | s ∈ S}) on
S. pˆs is determined by the distribution on the next state ta in S∗ from a
start at sa ∈ S∗. p
s is defined likewise, however from a start at sb ∈ S∗.
The distribution on the states outside of P with the ps is the same as with
the original transitions ps on S. Because of our assumption concerning the
avoiding of exits, Lemma 3.5 applies to the difference between pˆ and p. The
claim for the taboo probabilities follows directly from Lemma 3.5, as does
also the claim for the harmonic functions. ✷
Lemma 3.6 works because it is based upon the rare use of an exit. Much
more problematic is analysing the consequences of the certain use of an exit.
This is the content of Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 3.7 Assume the context of Lemma 3.6 and that p is an exit from
P at t ∈ P with g(p) > 0. We have
1) |g(p)− g♯(p)| ≤ 4Nδ + δ,
2) g(p) and g♯(p) differ by a factor of no more than 4Nδ +
2δ
ν(p)
,
3) ν(p) and ν♯(p) differ by a factor of no more than 4Nδ + 2δ +
4Nδ+δ
g(p)
,
4) |ν(p)− ν♯(p)| ≤ 8Nδ + 4δ,
5) |vr(p)− vr
♯
(p)| ≤M min{8Nδ + δ
g(p)
, 8Nδ + 2δ
ν(p)
)}.
Proof: 1) We define gˆ to be the probability that there is no return to the
set P after using the exit p in the original Markov chain. From Lemma 3.6
we see that gˆ is within a factor of 4Nδ of g♯(p). From the avoiding of exits
we get that |gˆ − g(p)| ≤ δ, which suffices.
2) By definition g(p) ≥ gˆ. First we show that esc(u, t) ≤ δgˆ/((1− δ)ν(p))
for all u ∈ P . Define wu be the probability that p will be used before returning
to u from a a start at t (with wu ≤ δ for all u ∈ P ). Define νu to be the
probability that the last visit to P is through the exit p from a start at u;
we have νu ≤ wugˆ/(wugˆ + esc(u, t)), which translates to esc(u, t) ≤ wugˆ/νu.
Finally notice that νu doesn’t differ from ν(p) by a factor of more than δ.
Next we compare g(p) with gˆ. For every u ∈ P let λu be the probability
that there is a return to P from the use of p in the original Markov chain
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and that u is the first member of P reached. Notice that
∑
u λu = 1− gˆ. We
have g(p) = gˆ +
∑
u λuesc(u, t). This suffices for (1− 2δ/ν(p))g(p) ≤ gˆ. Now
use Lemma 3.6 for the conclusion.
3) By definition ν∗(p) = fpg∗(p)/a∗(t
b) and ν(p) = fpg(p)/a(t). One way
to perceive a(t) is as the reciprocal of the expected number of visits to t from
a start at t. With this perspective by Lemma 3.6 and the avoiding of exits
we get that a∗(t
b) and a(t) don’t differ by a factor of more than 4Nδ + δ.
This means that if g∗(p) and g(p) don’t differ by a factor of more than γ
then ν∗(p) and ν(p) don’t differ by more than a factor of γ + 4Nδ+ δ. Since
ν♯(p) is also equal to the probability that the last visit to P starting at s
b
P
in the Markov chain S∗ went through the exit p we have that ν∗(p) is within
a factor of δ of ν♯(p) and therefore ν♯(p) and ν(p) don’t differ by a factor
of more than γ + 4Nδ + 2δ. By the same argument as in Part 1 comparing
g♯(p) with g(p) we get |g∗(p)− g(p)| ≤ 4δN + δ and therefore g∗(p) and g(p)
cannot differ by a factor of more than 4δN+δ
g(p)
and our conclusion.
4) The argument of Part 2 can be repeated with the Markov chain defined
on S∗ instead of the original on S. The quantity g(p) would be replaced
by g∗(p) and gˆ would be replaced by g♯(p). We have g∗(p) ≥ g♯(p) and
g∗(p) = g♯(p) + (1− g♯(p))esc∗(sb, tb).
If g(p) ≥ g∗(p) we need only g∗(p) ≥ g♯(p) and the conclusion of Part 2
to get g(p) ≥ (1− 2δ/ν(p)− 4δN)g∗(p). Combined with the arguments from
Part 3 we have our goal. On the other hand, if g∗(p) ≥ g(p) we get our result
from repeating Part 2 for g∗(p) and g♯(p), the same arguments of Part 3, plus
the claim that (1− 4δN − δ)esc∗(sbP , t
b) ≤ esc(sP , t).
esc∗(s
b, tb) is no more than (w+w2+ . . .)h∗ where w is the probability of
reaching an exit of P from sbP before returning to t
b and the quantity h∗ is
the expected value of g♯ conditioned on the use of one of these exits. On the
other hand we have that esc(sP , t) is at least whˆ where hˆ is the probability
of no return to the set P in the original Markov chain conditioned on the use
of one of these exits. From Lemma 3.6 we have that hˆ and h∗ differ by no
more than a factor of 4δN . That w ≤ δ completes the proof of the claim.
5) From the proof of Part 1 we had that gˆ ≥ (1 − δ/g(p))g(p) and from
Part 2 that gˆ ≥ (1− 2δ/ν(p))g(p). The rest follows from Lemma 3.6. ✷
Part 4 of Lemma 3.7 is remarkable because the sum of ν over all transi-
tions in a set P will be |P | rather than something close to one.
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3.3 Polarization
The process described below, of changing the transitions through a convex
combination of two transitions, one giving a higher value and the other giving
a lower value of a harmonic function, with the convex combination yielding
the same value, we call polarization.
Lemma 3.8 Let s and t be two non-absorbing states of an absorbing
Markov chain.
(i) Let p be a part of the transition at t such that ν(p) ≥ ǫ > 0.
(ii) Let p be a replacement transition at t such that g(p) ≥ ǫ.
(iii) Let p be a transition at t that is a convex combination of transitions
as described in (i) and (ii).
In all three above cases, if we replace the transitions at t by p, in the case
of (i) or (iii) using normalization, the resulting process is absorbing and the
absorption rate of s is at least ǫ times what is was before the changes were
made.
Proof: Let b, c, d and e stand for the same quantities as in the proof of
Lemma 3.1, with A the set of absorbing sets and B the empty set.
(i) It follows from Lemma 3.1.
(ii) Let a∗(s), d∗ and e∗ be the corresponding quantities when p is the
transition at t. We assume that e∗ + d∗
b
b+c
≥ ǫ. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that ǫ(b + ce
d+e
) = ǫa(s) > a∗(s) = b +
ce∗
d∗+e∗
. Then we have
be∗+ ce∗+ bd∗ ≥ (b+ c)ǫ ≥ ǫ(b+
ce
d+e
) > bd∗+be∗+ce∗
d∗+e∗
. This implies d∗+ e∗ > 1,
also a contradiction.
(iii) First we must assume that b < ǫa(s), since otherwise there would
be nothing to prove. Let ai, di and ei for i = 1, 2 stand for the resulting
probabilities from (i) and (ii), respectively, and after normalization in the
case of (i). With the convex combinations d˜ := λd1 + (1 − λ)d2 and e˜ :=
λe1+(1−λ)e2 being the new transition quantities, we have that our desired
result is equivalent to e˜
e˜+d˜
≥ ǫ e
e+d
+ ǫb−b
c
. But this follows from (i), (ii), and
the fact that x1
y1
≥ z and x2
y2
≥ z implies λx1+(1−λ)x2
λy1+(1−λ)y2
≥ z for all non-negative
quantities xi, yi, z and 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. ✷
Proposition 3.9 Let r1 and r2 be two harmonic functions, and we assume
that the Markov chain is absorbing. Let N be the number of non-absorbing
states. Let 1 be a uniform bound on all differences in the values of r1 and
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r2. Let w1, w2, v1, and v2 stand for wr
1
, wr
2
, vr
1
, and vr
2
, respectively.
Let 1/2 > ǫ > δ > γ > 0, with δ < ǫǫ
3N
2N(3N)N
. Let p∗s be a part of the
transition at s such that w2(p∗s) ≤ r
2(s)− ǫ (including the possibility that p∗s
is empty). Assume that if ν(p∗s) ≥ γ then there is an alternative transition
ps at s such that w
2(ps) ≤ r2(s) − ǫ, |v1(ps) − r1(s)| ≤ δ, and there exists
another part qs of the transition at s such that q
d
s , the complement of the
union of qs with p
∗
s, satisfies (v
2(qds )− r
2(s))ν(qds ) ≤ Nδ/ǫ. For every subset
T ⊆ {s | ν(p∗s) ≥ γ, w
2(qs) > r
2(s)} define a new time homogeneous Markov
chain by the transitions at t ∈ T defined by λpt+ (1− λ)qt with λ satisfying
λw2(pt) + (1− λ)w2(qt) = r2(t) and furthermore for every v ∈ S\T the part
p∗v is discarded, followed by normalization. Let the subscript T stand for the
quantities determined by the new transitions with the changes in T .
Conclusion: There is a subset T ⊆ {s | ν(p∗s) ≥ γ, w
2(qs) > r
2(s)} such
that the new process is absorbing and for both i = 1, 2 and all s ∈ S |riT (s)−
ri(s)| ≤ ǫ
Proof: First we consider what happens when the changes are made only
at a set T (meaning that the part p∗s is kept in for v 6∈ T ), which we will
label with T, ∗. Because r2 remains a harmonic function after the changes
are made and there is always a positive probability at all states in T that
the harmonic function drops by ǫ, the resulting time homogeneous Markov
chain is absorbing with r2T,∗(s) = r
2(s) for every s ∈ S.
Next we must determine which subset T will be chosen. Choose any t1
such that ν(p∗t1) ≥ ǫ
2/2N , and put t1 in T . If there exists no such t ∈ S then
let T be the empty set. At any set T with |T | = k − 1 formed so far, put
into T any tk such that νT,∗(p
∗
tk
) ≥ ǫ2/2N , and stop if there is no such new
state tk.
Claim: For any set T that has been already chosen and any t 6∈ T that
could be added to T we have aT∪{t},∗(u) ≥
ǫ3
3N
aT,∗(u) ≥
ǫ3
3N
ǫ3|T |
(3N)|T |
a(u) for all
u ∈ S, gT,∗(qt) ≥
ǫ3
3N
ǫ3|T |
(3N)|T |
g(qt) and w
2(qt) > r
2(t).
Proof of Claim: Assume that t will be added to T . Look at the tran-
sition qdt and the indentities w
2
T,∗(q
d
t )− r
2
T,∗(t) = w
2(qdt )− r
2(t) = (v2T,∗(q
d
t )−
r2T,∗(t))gT,∗(q
d
t ) = (v
2(qdt )− r
2(t))g(qdt ) from the fact that r
2 remains the har-
monic function. Consider the definitions νT,∗(q
d
t ) = fqdt gT,∗(q
d
t )/aT,∗(t) and
ν(qdt ) = fqdt g(q
d
t )/a(t); they show that the new absorption rate determines
alone the new value (v2T,∗(q
d
t )− r
2
T,∗(t))νT,∗(q
d
t ). From the induction assump-
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tion we must conclude that νT,∗(q
d
t )(v
2
T,∗(q
d
t )− r
2(t)) ≤ (3N)
|T |
ǫ3|T |
ν(qdt )(v
2(qdt )−
r2(t)) ≤ (3N)
|T |
ǫ3|T |
Nδ
ǫ
< ǫ3/6N . If qct is the union of q
d
t with p
∗
t from νT,∗(p
∗
t ) ≥
ǫ2/2N and w2T,∗(p
∗
t ) ≤ r
2(t)− ǫ we get that νT,∗(qct )(v
2
T,∗(q
c
t )− r
2(t)) ≤ − ǫ
3
3N
,
which implies that w2(qt) > r
2(t) and νT,∗(qt) ≥ ǫ3/(3N).
Next suppose for the sake of contradiction that gT,∗(qt) <
ǫ3
3N
ǫ3|T |
(3N)|T |
g(qt).
Since ν(qt) = fqtg(qt)/a(t), νT,∗(qt) = fqtgT,∗(qt)/aT,∗(t) and νT,∗(qt) ≥ ǫ
3/(3N),
by the induction assumption we would be forced to accept ν(qt) > 1, an im-
possibility.
By Lemma 3.8 we have our claim on the absorbing rates for all states
other than t. For the state t we have gT,∗(qt) ≥ fqtgT,∗(qt) = νT,∗(qt)aT,∗(t) ≥
ǫ3aT,∗(t)/(3N). With gT,∗(pt) ≥ ǫ our claim is proven.
With the claim we conclude from Lemma 2.1 that |r1T,∗(s) − r
1(s)| ≤
(3N)|T |
ǫ3|T |
δN ≤ ǫ/2 for all s ∈ S.
Next, we must show that it is impossible for any state s not polarized
to satisfy νT,∗(p
∗
s) ≥ ǫ
2/N . This holds for all states with ν(p∗s) ≥ γ, by
construction. Let’s assume that ν(p∗s) < γ; this means that the probability
of ever using p∗s in the original Markov chain cannot exceed γ/ǫ. But by
the above claim we know additionally that the probability of using p∗s in the
altered Markov chain indexed by T, ∗ cannot exceed γ
ǫ
ǫ3(N−1)
(3N)N−1
< ǫ2/2N .
Next we must consider the influence of the removed p∗t in the above
Markov chain indexed by T, ∗. For any s with νT,∗(p
∗
s) ≤ ǫ
2/2N the chance
of ever using the transition p∗t cannot exceed ǫ/2N , and so they cannot con-
tribute an average of more than ǫ/2 to either the function r1 or r2. ✷
4 From Markov Chains to Equilibria
4.1 Application of the Doob-Kolmogorov Inequality
We must prove Proposition 4.2, a cornerstone of our analysis.
Lemma 4.1: Let X be the finite state space of a time homogeneous
Markov chain with probability transitions (px ∈ ∆(X) | x ∈ X). Let v :
X → R be a harmonic function and let M > 0 be a bound for the maximal
difference between all values of v.
For every x ∈ X define the non-negative quantities w(x) by w(x) =
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∑
y∈X p
x(y)|v(y)−v(x)|. Let n be the number of states x such that w(x) > 0.
For any path p = (x0, x1, x2, ...) in X define w(p) =
∑∞
i=0w(xi).
Conclusion: The expected value of the function w does not exceed Mn.
Proof: We isolate the problem, handling each state x separately. Since
|v(y)− v(x)| is always less than or equal to M times esc(y, x), we have that
w(x) ≤ a(x)M . Therefore the part of the sum that comes from visits to x
does not exceed a(x)M
∑∞
i=0(1− a(x))
i =M . ✷
Proof of Proposition 4.2 (as stated in the introduction):
Define the random variable ri on the odd steps i to be v(yi) − v(xi−1),
and Ri to be the sum of the rk for odd k ≤ i. For y ∈ Yx define r(y) to be
v(y)− v(x).
Define a new quantity, w˜(x) :=
∑
y∈Yx p
x(y)|v(y)−v(x)|. Let w(x) be the
old quantity on the Markov chain from Lemma 4.1 defined only on the X , –
we ignore the visits to the Yx sets, and consider only the motions from X to
X .
The Doob submartingale inequality states that if (Si | i = 0, 1, . . . , n)
is a martingale with zero expectation then for every n ≥ 0, positive value
c > 0 and exponent p ≥ 1 the probability that maxi≤n |Si| > c is less than
E(|Sn|p)/cp (Williams 1991, Section 14.6). Since the martingale property
implies that E(S2n) is equal to the sum over all the stages 1 ≤ i ≤ n of E(s
2
i )
where si is the change in value between the i− 1st stage and the ith stage,
we have for every finite even and positive Q
Probability
(
max
i<Q
|Ri| > ǫ
)
<
1
ǫ2
E
( ∑
i<Q, y∈Yxi−1
pxi−1(y)r(y)2
)
.
By taking the limit as Q goes to infinity and δ ≤ |r(y)| we get
Probability
(
max
i<∞
|Ri| > ǫ
)
<
1
ǫ2
E
( ∑
i<∞, y∈Yxi−1
pxi−1(y)r(y)2
)
≤
δ
1
ǫ2
E
( ∑
i<∞, y∈Yxi−1
pxi−1(y)|r(y)|
)
= δ
1
ǫ2
E
( ∑
i<∞, y∈Yxi−1
w˜(xi−1)
)
.
Since by the triangle inequality w˜(x) ≤ w(x) for all x, we have
Probability
(
max
i<∞
|Ri| > ǫ
)
< δ
1
ǫ2
E
( ∑
i<∞, y∈Yxi−1
w(xi−1)
)
,
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and by Lemma 4.1 this is no more than δMn/ǫ2. So with ǫ ≤ 1/2, we have
our result from the size of δ. ✷
The problem of extending Proposition 4.2 to Markov chains that are not
time homogeneous (or have countably many states) lies with Lemma 4.1 and
not in the proof of Proposition 4.2.
The following corollary relates the above work on Markov chains to our
two-person stochastic games. Because the application of this corollary in-
volves an altered state space, this result should be understood in an abstract
way.
Corollary 4.3: Let (x, y) ∈ X × Y be stationary absorbing strategies.
Assume that
1) for both players k = 1, 2 and s ∈ S rkx,y(s) is greater than j
k
z (s) − ǫ with
z = x if k = 2 and z = y if k = 1, and that
2) for both player k = 1, 2 and all moves c used with positive probability
with (x, y) by Player k the value wkx,y(c) is within δ of r
k
x,y(s).
Conclusion: For any positive ǫ < 1/2 if δ is no more than ǫ
3
n
then the
strategies (x, y) generate a 4ǫ-equilibrium of the stochastic game.
Proof: We define the following strategy for Player k. For every starting
point s0 ∈ S let ns0 be large enough such that with a start at s0 and the
play according to (x, y) the probability that there is no absorption before the
ns0th stage is less than ǫ/10. Let s0, s1, . . . be any sequence of states reached
in the game and for both k let ck0, c
k
1, . . . be the sequence of moves made by
Player k. For k′ 6= k as long as
∑l
i=0(w
k′
x,y(c
k′
i ) − r
k′
x,y(si)) ≤ ǫ and the stage
l does not exceed ns0 and Player k
′ never chooses ck
′
i outside of the support
set of his stationary strategy, then Player k continues to act according to
his stationary strategy. As soon as one of the above conditions is violated
at some stage l then on the next stage l + 1 both players punish eachother
according to the functions c1 + ǫ and c2 + ǫ. (The mutual punishment is
necessary because otherwise a player could intentionally prolong the game
with an interest in punishing the other player. The result can be extended
to multi-player stochastic games if it can be determined who should punish
whom in all situations!) That no player k can obtain an expected payoff
more than 2ǫ above the function rk by choosing a different strategy is self
explanatory. That punishment occurs before absorption with probability no
more than 2ǫ if both players adhere to the suggested strategies follows from
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Proposition 4.2. ✷
4.2 Situations
Next we create an expanded state space from the original state space through
partitions of the histories. For every s ∈ S let Ps be a partition ofHs. Define
Sˆ to be the disjoint union ∪s∈SPs. For every t ∈ Sˆ let b(t) ∈ S be the member
of S such that t ∈ Pb(t). A member of Sˆ we call a situation. We define the
situations Sˆ to be normal if and only if the next u ∈ Sˆ following a t ∈ Sˆ
is determined by the situation t, the choice of moves by the players at t,
and the next s ∈ S with b(u) = s. Normalcy implies that one can define a
stochastic game on the situations as a new state space.
Corollary 4.4: Let the situations Sˆ be normal, let absorbing stationary
strategies (x, y) ∈
∏
s∈Sˆ ∆(A
b(s)
1 )×
∏
s∈Sˆ ∆(A
b(s)
2 ) be defined on the situations
Sˆ, with rˆkx,y : Sˆ → R the expected payoff for Player k as determined by the
above stationary strategies and the functions rk on the absorbing states and
wˆkx,y the corresponding expected value of rˆ
k
x,y on the next stage. Assume that
1) for every s ∈ Sˆ rˆk(s) ≥ jkz (b(s)) − ǫ where z = x if k = 2 and z = y if
k = 1 and
2) for every move c used with positive probability at a situation s by Player
k |wˆkx,y(c)− rˆ
k
x,y(s)| ≤ δ.
If δ is no more than ǫ
3
|Sˆ|
then these stationary strategies generate a 4ǫ-
equilibrium of the original stochastic game.
Proof: Because a stochastic game is defined by the normality of Sˆ and
the conditions of Corollary 4.3 are preserved, the result follows by Corollary
4.3. ✷
4.3 First Main Theorem
For any subset R ⊆ N and a state s ∈ R, a pair a ∈ As1 and b ∈ A
s
2 of moves
is called a primitive exit from the set R if with positive probability there is
motion from s to S\R using the pair a and b. By the definition of ρ, any use
of a primitive exit at s results in a probability of at least ρ of reaching the
complement of R.
For every subset B of Player Two moves in a set R we define a B exit (or
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simply exit if there is no ambiguity) from R to be any pair (a, b) of moves at
an s ∈ R such that (a, b) is already a primitive exit from R or b ∈ B. Let
EB(R) stand for the set of all B exits from R.
Define Bγx,y(s) to be those moves of Player Two at the state s with
w2x,y(b) ≤ rx,y(s) − γ, and let B
γ
x,y(R) be the union of all the B
γ
x,y(s) for
all s ∈ R. For every s ∈ N define zγx,y(s) to be
∑
b∈Bγx,y(s) ν
b. For any subset
R ⊆ N define zγx,y(R) :=
∑
s∈R z
γ
x,y(s).
For any stationary strategy x ∈ X (or y ∈ Y ) define a simplication of x to
be another stationary strategy x ∈ X obtained from x by dropping the use of
certain moves, followed by normalizing what remains. Call the simplification
a γ-simplication if the frequency of the moves removed did not exceed γ. The
simplication is within a set T of states if changes were made only within the
set T .
Theorem 1: Assume for every choice of positive 1/2 > ǫ > ǫ > ǫˆ > ǫ˜ > 0
with ǫ < ǫ3/(50|N |), ǫˆ < ǫ ǫ
3|N|
5(3|N |)|N||N |
and ǫ˜ < ǫ ǫˆ/40|N | that
1) there are absorbing stationary strategies (x, y) ∈ X × Y with
a) r2x,y(s) ≥ j
2
x(s)− ǫ/2 for all s ∈ N ,
b) r1x,y(s) ≥ j
1
y(s)− ǫ/2 for all s ∈ N , and
c) for every move a of Player One used in x with positive probability at s we
have |w1x,y(a)− r
1
x,y(s)| ≤ ǫ˜,
2) a partition R of a subset P ⊆ N and for every R ∈ R a set BR of Player
Two moves in R containing Bǫx,y(R) such that
a) ∀s 6∈ P z2.5ǫx,y (s) < ǫ˜ and
b) for every distinct s, t ∈ R ∈ R the probability of reaching s from t before
using a member of EBR(R) is at least 1− γ∗ with γ∗ := ǫ˜ ǫ/(40n|N |),
and for any R ∈ R if z2.5ǫx,y (R) ≥ ǫ˜ then there is a special subset DR ⊆ R, a
representative sR ∈ DR and
3) an ǫ˜ simplication yR of y within R created by removing the set BR of
moves such that
a)v2x,y(b) ≤ r
2(s) for every b ∈ BR ∩A2s and
b) |r1x,yR(sR)− r
1
x,y(sR)| ≤ ǫˆ,
4) ǫ˜-simplications (xC , yC) of (x, y) within DR such that with (xC , yC) the
play never leaves the set DR and from any state in DR all other states in DR
are reached with probability one, and
5) a strategy yD created from yC by adding to yC in the setDR small probabil-
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ities of using a subset of Player Two moves VR used in DR with VR ⊆ B2.4ǫx,y (R)
and a real positive value ξR ≤ r2x,y(sR)− 2.4ǫ such that
a) with (xC , yD) for every pair s, t ∈ DR the probability of reaching s from t
before using a member of VR is at least 1− γ∗
b) ξR ≥ j2x(t)− ǫ for all t ∈ DR,
c) for all moves b ∈ VR |w2x,y(b)− ξR| ≤ ǫ˜, and
d) |r1xC ,yD(s)− r
1
x,y(s)| ≤ ǫˆ.
Conclusion: With the assumption that Player One can send transition in-
dependent signals, the stochastic game has approximate equilibria.
Proof: We define the set B of Player Two moves to be ∪R∈RBR∪s 6∈P B
s
2,
and define the exits to be the B exits. Let the corresponding state spaces S∗
and S♯ from Lemma 3.6 be induced by (x, y) and the partition R∪{{s} | s 6∈
P}. For every sR ∈ S♯ let p∗R be the transition at sR in S♯ induced by
the Player Two moves in B2.5ǫx,y (R). For every R ∈ R define pR to be the
alternative transition from sR in S♯ induced by the Player Two moves VR
according to (xC , yD). Define q
c
R to be the transition induced by the moves
in BR, and define q
d
R so that q
c
R is the disjoint union of q
d
R with p
∗
R.
We will confirm the conditions of Proposition 3.9 on the state space S♯,
with 2.4ǫ, 2ǫˆ, and 2ǫ˜ the quantities ǫ, δ, and γ of that lemma, respectively.
First, by Lemma 3.6 the Markov chain on S♯ is absorbing. For i = 1, 2
let ri♯ : S♯ → R be the harmonic function that agrees with the function r
i on
the absorbing states. If ν♯(p
∗
sR
) ≥ 2ǫ˜ then by Lemma 3.7 z2.5ǫx,y (R) ≥ 3ǫ˜/2 and
if s 6∈ P then ν♯(p
∗
s) ≤ 1.1z
2.5ǫ
x,y (s) ≤ 1.1ǫ˜. By Lemma 3.6 we have for every
representative sR that r
i
♯(sR) is within 4γ
∗|N | of rix,y(sR). Equally important,
Lemma 3.7 implies that wr
2
♯ (p∗R) ≤ r
2
♯ (sR) − 2.4ǫ, and |v
r1
♯ (pR) − r1♯ (sR)| ≤
11ǫˆ/10. Since qdR is induced by some BR moves by Lemma 3.7 and Condition
3a we have (vr
2
♯ (qdR)− r
2
♯ (sR))ν♯(q
d
R) < 2ǫ˜.
Left to confirm is that |vr
1
♯ (qR)−r1♯ (sR)| ≤ 2ǫˆ. We apply Lemma 3.6 to the
pair (x, yR) and the transitions it induces on S♯. Since the avoiding of exits by
(x, y) implies the same for the pair (x, yR), we have that |r1(sR)−r1x,yR(sR)| ≤
4γ∗|N |, where r1 is the harmonic function induced by (x, yR) on S♯. r
1(sR)
is equal to vr
1
♯ (qR). With the given |r1x,yR(sR) − r
1
x,y(sR)| ≤ ǫˆ and the above
relation of r1x,y to r
1
♯ we are done establishing the conditions of Proposition
3.9.
We apply Proposition 3.9 to S♯ with T the subset of R that has been
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polarized. We conclude that the new harmonic functions r˜iT := (r
i
♯)T on S♯
satisfy |r˜iT (s)− r
i
x,y(s)| ≤ 3ǫ for all s 6∈ P and |r˜
i
T (sR)− r
i
x,y(sR)| ≤ 3ǫ for all
R ∈ R.
Next we define the situations Sˆ, with one, two, or three situations defined
for each original state in S. For any s 6∈ P or for s ∈ R ∈ R with R 6∈ T
not polarized there is only the situation se (including the case of absorbing
states). We always start the game at an se. At any situation se for s 6∈ P
or s in a non-polarized R 6∈ T the players perform (xs, yˆs) where yˆs is the
γ∗ simplication of ys resulting from the removal of all Player Two moves in
B2.5ǫx,y (s). If s is in a polarized R ∈ T and is not the representative sR the
players perform (x, yR). Following any s
e other than s = sR the next situation
is a te, where t is the next state in S. Also following the performance of an
exit, no matter what the situation was on the previous stage, if t ∈ S occurs
on the following stage then the next situation is also te. This means that
only motion inside of an R ∈ T involves situations other than those with the
subscript e.
At any s ∈ R ∈ T there is either two situations se and sf if s 6∈ DR or
three situations se, sf , and sg if s ∈ DR. For such an R ∈ T let λR be the
quantity determined by the application of Proposition 3.9 to the transitions
on S♯. Since Player One can send signals, for every sR ∈ DR for a polarized
R ∈ T we associate one of every pair of her moves with the symbol f and the
other with the symbol g. If seR is the present situation then with probability
λR Player One chooses a move associated with the symbol g and with 1−λR
a move associated with the symbol f ; in both cases the players perform
(xC , yC). (Because all moves are paired, we can modify xC to use only those
moves corresonding to f or only moves corresponding to g without changing
the transition probabilities in the space S.) If t is the next state and a move
corresponding to f was used, then tf is the next situation; otherwise the next
situation is tg. At any sf with s ∈ R ∈ T the play continues according to
(x, yR), always to a next situation t
f if there was no use of an exit. On the
other hand, from any sg with s ∈ DR the motion follows (xC , yD), and unless
a move from VR is used the next situation is a t
g, necessarily with t ∈ DR.
Define rˆi to be the harmonic function on Sˆ determined by the above
defined stationary behavior and rˆi = ri on the absorbing states. Given the
above conditions, to apply Corollary 4.4 it suffices that neither player i can
change the expected value of rˆi by more than 10ǫ at any one stage. With
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the role of the ξR we need only show that rˆ
i is within ǫ of ri♯ on all the sR
and the s 6∈ P . To do this, we introduce two new transitions defined on
S, indexed by ◦ and ≀. p≀ and p◦ are identical on states s that are not in
a polarized R, and then it is that induced by the behavior at the situation
se. At s in a polarized R ∈ T ps≀ is the distribution determined by the
next situation te following the situation se. ps◦ is determined by the next
situation te conditioned on having reached either sfR or s
g
R before any exit
was performed. The ps◦ transitions generate harmonic functions r
i
◦ that are
identical to ri♯ on the S♯, and the p≀ transitions generate harmonic functions
ri≀ that are identical to rˆ
i on the subset {se | s ∈ S}. Because λR cannot be
greater than 1− 2ǫ and the probability from a situation se that an exit from
the stationary strategies (x, yR) is used before getting to s
e
R is no more than
than γ∗, for every s, t ∈ S the transition probability ps≀ (t) does not differ by
more than a factor of γ∗/ǫ from ps◦(t). Finally Lemma 3.5 implies that the
functions ri◦ and r
i
≀ do not differ by more than 4γ
∗|N |/ǫ < ǫ˜. ✷
5 The auxiliary game
The main issue is to define the “correct” discounted evaluation of Player
Two, since, as shown in Solan (2000), a naive definition of his discounted
evaluation does not prove equilibrium existence when there are a multitude
of non-absorbing states.
We assume that positive ǫ and ǫ have been fixed.
5.1 The function ξ
Let b be any move of Player Two at a state s ∈ N .
For any (x, y) ∈ X × Y define
g˜bx,y =
{
1 gbx,y ≥ ǫ
gbx,y/ǫ g
b
x,y < ǫ.
Define the auxiliary absorption rate by a˜x,y(s) =
∑
b∈B y
s
b g˜
b
x,y. Note that
a(s) ≤ a˜(s) ≤ a(s)/ǫ.
Define v˜2(b) = (1−
gb
g˜b
)r2(s) +
gb
g˜b
v2(b) (6)
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with v˜2(b) := r2(s) if gb = g˜b = 0.
Next we need to use large quantities Q1 > 1 and Q2 > 1 that will be
determined precisely later (in the next section) by the choice of α, ǫ, ǫ, ǫˆ and
ǫ˜. Define L := Q1Q2 and define K := L
|N |.
Define the function h : [1,∞) → [1, K] by h(r) = min{r,K}. Order the
members {s1, . . . , sm} of N with a˜x,y(s1) ≤ a˜x,y(s2) ≤ . . . a˜x,y(sm). Define
w˜x,y(sk) =
m−1∏
j=k
h(
a˜x,y(sj+1)
a˜x,y(sj)
).
For any move b at a state s ∈ N define gbx,y to satisfy
(1− g˜bx,y) = (1− g
b
x,y)(1− g
b
x,y). (7)
If g˜bx,y = 1, then g
b
x,y = 1 as well. Note that
gbv2(b) + (1− gb)gbr2(s) = gbv2(b) + (g˜b − gb)r2(s) = g˜bv˜2(b). (8)
For every s ∈ N and h ∈ H˜ denote N s(h) = #{n ∈ N | sn = s} ∈ N∪∞.
For 1 ≤ i ≤ N s(h) let nsi (h) be the stage with the ith occurrence of the state
s in h. If the initial state of h is s, then ns1 = 0 and N
s(h) ≥ 1.
Define the discounted evaluation of a move b at a state s ∈ N according
to
ξbx,y = E
b
x,yr
2(h) [
Ns(h)−1∑
i=1
g
bns
i
(h)(1−
δ
w˜x,y(s)
)i−1
i−1∏
k=1
(1− g
bns
k
(h))+
(1−
δ
w˜x,y(s)
)N
s(h)−1
Ns(h)−1∏
k=1
(1− g
bns
k
(h)) ] , (9)
where Ebx,y stands for the expectation over all infinite histories h ∈ H˜ with
initial state s0 = s, assuming that Player Two plays the action b at stage
0, the first stage, and afterwards follows y, whereas Player One follows x
always.
Lemma 5.1 The function ξbx,y obeys the properties
ξbx,y = g˜
b
x,yv˜
2
x,y(b) + (1−
δ
w˜x,y(s)
)(1− g˜bx,y)ξx,y(s) (10)
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and
r2x,y(s) = ξx,y(s)
(
1 +
δ(1− a˜x,y(s))
w˜x,y(s)a˜x,y(s)
)
(11)
where ξx,y(s) =
∑
b∈As2
ysbξ
b
x,y.
Proof:
We now verify that ξ satisfies (10) and (11). Separate the summation in
(9) into three parts.
• All histories such that N s(h) = 1. The probability of this event is gb,
and the conditional expectation is v2(b).
• All histories such that N s(h) > 1 and i = 1. The probability of this
event is 1− gb, and the conditional expectation is gbr2(s).
• All histories such that N s(h) > 1 and i > 1. The probability of this
event is 1−gb. Factor out one power of (1−gb)(1− δ
w˜
); the conditional
expectation is (1 − gb)(1 − δ
w˜
)ξ(s). By (7) this part contributes (1 −
g˜b)(1− δ
w˜
)ξ(s) to the sum.
Putting together the three parts, with (8) connecting the first two parts, we
get (10). For equation (11) we use (10) and take the expectation with respect
to the moves. ✷
Notice that formula (11) is a slight variation of the standard relation-
ship between discounted and undiscounted evaluations. ξ will serve as the
auxiliary discounted payoff evaluation of Player Two. Note that r2x,y(s) ≥
ξx,y(s) ∀s ∈ N . Define ξx,y(s) to be maximal value maxb∈As2 ξ
b
x,y.
Lemma 5.2: For every s, t ∈ N , γ > 0, and (δ, x, y) ∈ (0, 1]×X × Y
• a˜x,y(t) ≤ Ka˜x,y(s) implies that w˜x,y(t)a˜x,y(t) ≤ w˜x,y(s)a˜x,y(s),
• w˜x,y(s)a˜x,y(s) ≤ w˜x,y(t)a˜x,y(t) and r2x,y(s) ≤ r
2
x,y(t) + γ imply that
ξx,y(s) ≤ ξx,y(t) + γ + δ.
Proof: The first part follows directly from the definition of w˜. For the second
part, note that for every r, w˜, a > 0 and 0 < δ < 1
rw˜a
w˜a + δ(1− a)
−
rw˜a
w˜a + δ
=
rw˜a2δ
(w˜a + δ)(w˜a+ δ − δa)
≤
rw˜a2δ2
w˜2a2
=
rδ
w˜
.
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Moreover, rw˜a
w˜a+δ
is an increasing function in w˜a. Given w˜ ≥ 1, from the above
we have that r2(s) and w˜(s)a˜(s) determine ξ(s) except for a quantity of no
more than δ. ✷
5.2 The Best Reply Correspondence
For every state s ∈ N define
Bsδ,1(x, y) = argmaxa∈As1 w
1
x,y(a)
Bsδ,2(x, y) = argmaxb∈As2 ξ
b
x,y if ξx,y(s) > j
α
x (s)
Bsδ,2(x, y) = J
α
x (s) ∪ argmaxb∈As2 ξ
b
x,y if ξx,y(s) = j
α
x (s).
Bsδ,2(x, y) = J
α
x (s) if ξx,y(s) < j
α
x (s).
Player One maximizes her un-discounted payoff, while Player Two maximizes
his auxiliary payoff, given that it is not too small.
Let the corresondences B
s
δ,1 and B
s
δ,2 be those defined by the closure of the
graphs of the correspondences Bsδ,1 and B
s
δ,2 in (X×Y )×A
s
1 and (X×Y )×A
s
2,
respectively. Define conv (B
s
δ,1) and conv (B
s
δ,2) to be the correspondences
with graphs in (X × Y )×Xs and (X × Y )× Y s, respectively, such that z ∈
conv (B
s
δ,1(x, y)) if and only if {a ∈ A
s
1 | za > 0} is a subset of B
s
δ,1(x, y)
and z ∈ conv (B
s
δ,2(x, y)) if and only if {b ∈ A
s
2 | zb > 0} is a subset of
B
s
δ,2(x, y). Define the correspondences Bδ,1 from X×Y to X so that (x, y) in
the domain corresponds to the sets Bsδ,1(x, y) in the range, and likewise define
the correspondence Bδ,2 from X × Y to Y . We define the correspondence
Fδ : X × Y →→ X × Y by Fδ(x, y) = (Bδ,1(x, y), Bδ,2(x, y)). By Kakutani’s
fixed point theorem for every δ > 0 the correspondence Fδ has a fixed point.
5.3 Two Lemmas on Fixed Points
We assume in the rest of the section that (x, y) is a fixed point for Fδ. We
prove Lemmatta 5.4 and 5.5, described in the introduction.
Remark 5.3: Since the jump correspondence is used before ξ gets close
to 0, any fixed point (x, y) of Fδ is absorbing. This implies that r
2
x,y(s) ≥
jαx (s) ∀s ∈ N . Indeed, suppose for the sake of contradiction that r
2
x,y(s) <
jαx (s). Denote by e the stopping time that is defined by the first stage in which
the game leaves the set {u | ξx,y(u) < jαx (u)}. Recall from Section 2 that j
α
x is
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a sub-martingale. Since for every absorbing state s ∈ A ξ(s) = jα(s) = r2(s)
we have jαx (s) ≤ Ej
α
x (se) ≤ Eξx,y(se) ≤ Er
2
x,y(se) = r
2
x,y(s), as desired.
Lemma 5.4 If ǫ ≤ ωα/4 then there is a choice for L∗ > 1 and δ∗ > 0
such that if L ≥ L∗ and 0 < δ ≤ δ∗ and (x, y) is a fixed point of Fδ then
1) ξx,y(s) ≥ jαx (s) for all s ∈ N ,
2) if the jump correspondence is used at s then ξx,y(s) ≤ r2x,y(s)− 3ǫ
3) for any action b from Jαx (s) used in y
s gbx,y < ǫ , and
4) the overall probability that Player Two plays an action from Jαx (s) at any
s ∈ N is at most ωα/20.
Proof: Let L∗ = 100|N |
ω2α2ǫ
and δ∗ = ǫα3ω3/(300|N |). Choose t to be a
member of N with the largest difference jαx (t)− ξ(t), and we must presume
that this difference is non-negative. We will show that this difference can be
no more than 0 and that the frequency devoted to the jump correspondence
at any such state can be no more than αω/20.
We presume for the sake of contradiction that the frequency devoted to
the jump correspondence at t is at least αω/20. Since r2 ≥ jαx the expected
value of the jump function jαx at the states reached on the next stage after
t using the jump correspondence Jαx is at least αω more than j
α
x (t), we
must assume for any move from Jαx (t) that there is at least one state u
reached by this move with a probability of at least α
2ω2
40|N | such that j
α
x (u) ≥
jαx (t) + αω/2, necessarily with esc(u, t) ≤ αω/4. (If esc(u, t) > αω/4 then
a(t) ≥ α3ω3/(160|N |) and by (11) and the size of δ∗ we have made ξ(t) too
close to r2(t) contradicting jx(t) ≤ r
2(t) − αω/2, – which must follow by
Remark 5.3 since otherwise any move from the jump correspondence would
be evaluated in an undiscounted way strictly above the level jαx (t).) By the
definition of w˜, the size of L∗ and (3) we have w˜(t)a˜(t) ≥ w˜(u)a˜(u). By
esc(u, t) ≤ ωα/4 it follows that |r2(t) − r2(u)| ≤ ωα/4. But by Lemma
5.2 we have ξ(t) ≥ ξ(u) − δ − αω/4. With the size of δ∗ this contradicts
jαx (u) ≥ j
α
x (t) + αω/2 and the choice of t.
Next, suppose for the sake of contradiction that Jαx is used at s and g
b ≥ ǫ
for some move b ∈ Jαx (s). Indeed, g
b ≥ ǫ implies that g˜b = 1. In particular,
using Remark 5.3, ξbx,y = wx,y(b) ≥
∑
t p(t|s; x, b)j
α
x (t) ≥ j
α
x (s) + ωα. Thus,
for every b′ ∈ B2δ (x, y) that maximizes ξ, ξ
b′
x,y ≥ ξ
b
x,y ≥ r
2
x,y(s) ≥ jx(s)+ωα/2.
Since the overall probability to play actions from the jump correspondence
is smaller than ωα/20, this contradicts the assumption ξ(s) ≤ jαx (s).
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Now we presume for the sake of contradiction that ξ(s) ≥ r2(s)− 3ǫ and
the Jαx correspondence is used at s. Since we must assume that ξ(s) = j
α
x (s),
we have an increase in the value of r2 of at least ωα−3ǫ from a move in Jsx. By
the dominance of ωα over 4ǫ, we must conclude that gb > ǫ, a contradiction.
✷
Lemma 5.4 is the most problematic aspect of extending this proof to the
case of finitely many positions. Any identification of infinitely many states
as a single state may be meaningless if the states reached from it are not
also identified. A more flexible definition of the discounted evaluation may
be necessary. For example, at a state s one could discount future visits to
other states t according to the difference between Player Two’s undiscounted
expected payoffs from these two states.
The following lemma claims that if the auxiliary payoff is too far from
the real payoff and the action causes absorption with small probability, then
this probability is very small. This radical discontinuity is the key argument
to our whole approach.
Lemma 5.5 For L, α, ǫ and δ satisfying the conditions of Lemma 5.4
and (x, y) a fixed point of Fδ if ξ(s) ≤ r2(s) − 2ǫ and gb ≤ ǫ then gb ≤
1.1 δξ(s)/w˜(s) and gb ≤ 2.3 ǫa˜(s) ≤ 2.3 a(s).
Proof: First we claim that ξ(s)− ξ(s) < δαω
19w˜(s)
ξ(s).
If the jump correspondence at s is used and b is such a move, since gb ≤ ǫ
(from Lemma 5.4) it follows that g˜b = gb/ǫ. Hence from (6) we have
v˜2(b) = (1− ǫ)r2(s) + ǫv2(b) ≥ r2(s)− ǫ ≥ ξ(s) + ǫ. (12)
Moreover, from (10) and (12) we have
ξb ≥ ξ(s) + g˜b(v˜b − ξ(s))− δξ(s)/w˜(s) ≥ ξ(s)(1− δ/w˜(s)),
and by Lemma 5.4, since ξ(s) is the average of ξ(s) and such ξb, we have
(1− αω/20)(ξ(s)− ξ(s)) ≤ δαωξ(s)
20w˜(s)
, so the claim follows.
Considering now any move b ∈ As2 that is used with g
b ≤ ǫ and looking
again at formula (10) we have ξ(s) ≥ ξb ≥ g˜b(v˜b − ξ(s)) + (1 − δ/w˜(s))ξ(s)
and hence g˜b(v˜b − ξ(s)) ≤ 1.1 δξ(s)/w˜(s), since by the above claim ξ(s) −
ξ(s) is small compared to δ
w˜(s)
ξ(s). First consider the consequence of v˜b −
ξ(s) ≥ ǫ, namely gb = ǫg˜b ≤ 1.1 δξ(s)/w˜(s). Second, consider g˜b ≤
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1.1 δξ(s)
(v˜b−ξ(s))w˜(s)
≤ 1.1 δξ(s)
(r2(s)−ξ(s)−ǫ)w˜(s)
, proven above. Since r
2(s)−ξ(s)−ǫ
r2(s)−ξ(s)
≥ 1/2, we
get g˜b ≤ 2.2δξ(s)
(r2(s)−ξ(s))w˜(s) . Now apply formula (11) for 2ǫ ≤ r
2(s) − ξ(s) =
ξ(s) δ(1−a˜(s))
a˜(s)w˜(s)
. Since w˜(s) ≥ 1 and ξ(s) ≤ 1 we have δ(1 − a˜(s)) ≥ 2ǫa˜(s),
and from δ < ǫ/25 we have a˜(s) ≤ 1/50. This allows us to conclude with
gb
ǫ
= g˜b ≤ 25
24
2.2 a˜(s) ≤ 2.3 a˜(s) ≤ 2.3 a(s)
ǫ
. ✷
6 Second Main Theorem
The goal of this section is to prove Theorem 2, which states that the condi-
tions of Theorem 1 are always satisfied. First we need a simple but useful
lemma.
Lemma 6.1 For every two distinct non-absorbing states s, t with esc(t, s) ≤
γ < 1 in an absorbing time homogeneous Markov chain P t(t, s)µ(s, t) does
not differ from a(t) by more than a factor of 2γ, esc(t, s)/µ(t, s) is within a
factor of 3γ to the ratio that, starting at t or s, the last visit before absorp-
tion was at t rather than at s. Furthermore, with or without the assumption
that the Markov chain is absorbing and with a start at either s or t, the ratio
of the expected number of visits to s to those at t is at least 1 − 4γ times
the ratio of P t(t, s) to P s(s, t).
Proof: The first two claims follow directly from the formulas (1) and (2).
The third claim follows from the first claim if the Markov chain is absorbing.
Otherwise we recognize in 1/P t(t, s) the expected number of visits to t before
reaching s. ✷
Remark 6.2 At a fixed point of Fδ satisfying the properties of Lemmatta
5.4 and 5.5, if ξ(s) ≤ r2(s) − 2ǫ and b is a move at s with gb ≥ ǫ then
w2(b) = ξ(s), which is by Lemma 5.5 also within δ/20 of ξ(s).
Theorem 2: For any choice of positive ǫ, ǫ, ǫˆ, and ǫ˜ satisfying the
inequalities stated in Theorem 1 all conditions of Theorem 1 are satisfied.
Proof: Because it is sufficient to demonstrate the conclusion of Theorem
1 with smaller choices for ǫ, ǫˆ and ǫ˜, we will assume without loss of generality
that α is small enough so that for every s ∈ S cα(s) is within ǫ/2 of the
undiscounted zero-sum value c2(s), as described in Section 2, and ǫ < αω/4.
Define β := 1
2
ǫ˜ǫˆ|N |/(3|N ||N |). We require that L := Q1Q2 is large enough
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to satisfy the conditions of Lemma 5.4 and also that
Q1 > 80|N |3m2/(ρ ǫ2 ǫˆ2 ǫ˜2 β2) and Q2 > 80m|N |/(ρ ǫ ǫˆ ǫ˜).
We begin with δ sufficiently small, so that the condition of Lemma 5.4
holds. Next, we consider fixed points of Fδ corresponding to decreasing δ > 0
that have convergent subsequences for certain variables living in compact
spaces – the stationary strategies in the space X × Y , the values ν(a, b) for
all pairs of moves at all states, the expected payoffs r1(s), r2(s), and the
absorption rate a(s) for every s ∈ N , and the probabilities esc(t, s) for all
pairs of states.
We define a move a ∈ As1 or b ∈ A
s
2 to be a limit move if and only if the
frequency of its use does not converge to zero as δ goes to zero, and define qˆ
to be the minimal positive limit value for a frequency of a limit move chosen
by either player. We define the quantity µˆ to be the minimal positive limit
value for esc(s, t), νˆ to be the minimal positive limit value for ν(a, b), and aˆ
the minimal positive limit value for a(s).
Next we must define the partition R of a subset P . Define a directed
graph on the space N by t→ s if and only if in the limit esc(t, s) approaches
zero. The relation is transitive, but not necessarily symmetric. It has an
additional property, that if t → s1 and t → s2 then either s1 → s2 or
s2 → s1. This is easy to confirm, because if s1 was not reached with proba-
bility approaching one on the way from t to s2 then it must be reached with
probability approaching one after the state s2. Next define a relation ∼ that
is symmetric, transitive, and reflexive on a appropriate subset; s ∼ t if and
only if µ(s, t) approaches zero, and s ∼ s if and only if a(s) approaches zero.
∼ defines a partition P of a subset P ′ of N . Now we relate→ to ∼. Define R
to be the subset of P defined by A ∈ R ⊆ P if and only if u ∈ A and u→ s
implies that s ∈ A. Any state s 6∈ A ∈ R such that esc(s, u) approaches zero
for any (equivalently some) state u ∈ A ∈ R is called a satelite of A. Due to
the above, a satelite of A ∈ R cannot be a satelite of any other member of
R and every member of Q ∈ P such that Q is not in R must be a satelite of
the same A ∈ R. We call an primitive exit (a, b) from R ∈ R to be a satelite
exit if with certainty the exit results in motion that doesn’t leave R or its
collection of satelites.
For every R ∈ R we define the set BR of Player Two moves in R to be
BR := {b ∈ As2 | for some limit move a ∈ A
s
1 (a, b) is an primitive exit from
R that is not a satelite exit}.
If s is a satelite of R ∈ R then in the limit the probability that the last
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visit to the pair s or any u ∈ R was the state s must go to zero. Therefore
ν(a, b) approaches zero for any satelite exit (a, b) at u ∈ R ∈ R. These
facts follow directly from Lemma 6.1 and esc(s, u)/µ(u, s) going to zero in
the limit.
We show for every R ∈ R and pair s, t ∈ R that the probability of using
some exit in EBR(R) before reaching t from s also approaches zero. First
this holds for any non-satelite primitive exit from R, because the probability
of reaching a non-satelite outside of R would be at least ρ and therefore the
probability of absorbing before reaching t must be in the limit at least the
probability of using this exit times µˆρ. The same arguments holds for the
use of any move in BR, but with the quantity µˆρqˆ instead of µˆρ.
More difficult is to show that the above holds for any satelite exit (a, b) at
u ∈ R. Let v be any satelite of R reached with positive probability from this
exit. Let π be the probability of using (a, b) before reaching t from a start at
s and let θ be a bound on the probability of not reaching any member of R
from any other member of R or from a satelite of R. Let γˆ be the probability
of reaching v from s before reaching t, with γˆ ≥ πρ. Going through the state
v, the probability of reaching t is at least 1− θ and the combined probability
of reaching t from s is also at least 1− θ. This means that the probability of
reaching t from s conditioned on not going through v is at least 1− θ
(1−γˆ)
. So
conditioned on not arriving at v before t there is at most a 2θ
1−γˆ probability
of absorbing before getting back to s. In the limit 2θ
1−γˆ cannot stay above
1, because θ goes to zero and in the limit γˆ cannot go above 1 − µˆ. This
means that eventually the probability of reaching v from s must be at least
γˆ
∑∞
i=0(1− γˆ)
i(1− 2θ
1−γˆ )
i = γˆ
∑∞
i=0(1− 2θ − γˆ)
i = γˆ
2θ+γˆ
. But this probability
to reach v from s cannot go above 1 − µˆ in the limit, which is possible only
if π goes to zero as θ goes to zero also.
Define ǫ∗ to be (νˆµˆqˆaˆ/K)3|N |. We require of a fixed point of Fδ that the
values for which we have convergent subsequences are within ǫ∗ of their limit
values. We require that the probability of using any exit before moving from
any s to t for any pair s, t ∈ R ∈ R is no more than ǫ∗ and for every R ∈ R
that the sum of ν(a, b) over all the satelite exits (a, b) ∈ EBR(R) is no more
than ǫ∗ (as demonstrated above). Furthermore we require that δ < (ǫ∗)2. We
let (x, y) be a fixed point of Fδ satisfying these properties. If the stationary
strategy is not specified, then (x, y) is intended.
Step 1; For every s ∈ R ∈ R show that if z2.5ǫx,y (s) ≥ β then there
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exists an ǫ˜ simplication x of x such that z2.4ǫx,y (R) ≥ 1− 3|R|/Q1β and
for all t ∈ R that z2.4ǫx,y (t)/z
2.4ǫ
x,y (s) ≥ (1−
m
2ρQ2ǫ
− 4m|R|
ρQ2
)(z2.4ǫx,y (t)/z
2.4ǫ
x,y (s)):
For every d ≥ 1 define
Td = {t ∈ R | µ(s, t) ≤ da˜(s)} ∪ {s}.
Denote T = Td, where d ∈ (1, L|N |−1) satisfies TLd \ Td = ∅. Since K = L|N |,
for every t ∈ T we have a˜(t) ≤ a(t)/ǫ ≤ µ(s, t)/ǫ ≤ da˜(s)/ǫ ≤ Ka˜(s), and it
follows that w˜(t)a˜(t) ≤ w˜(s)a˜(s).With ξ(s) ≤ r(s)−2.5ǫ we have by (11) that
a˜(s) ≤ δ/ǫ, a(s) ≤ δ/ǫ, and µ(s, t) ≤ δK/ǫ < ǫ∗, meaning that T is a subset
of R. Since t ∈ T satisfies |r2(s)− r2(t)| ≤ ǫ∗ we have ξ(t) ≤ ξ(s) + (ǫ∗ + δ).
Define a quantity
pt =
{
a(t)/Q2µ(s, t) t ∈ T \ {s}
1/Q2 t = s
Define the stationary strategy x by removing from x all Player One moves at
states t ∈ T that are played with probability smaller than pt/ρ, and normalize
the remaining vector. This means that if u is reached in one stage from t ∈ T
by x and a Player Two move b, then p(u|t; x, b) ≥ pt.
We use critically from Lemma 6.1 that a(u)/µ(u, s) is approximately
P u(u, s) (within a factor of 2ǫ∗) for any u ∈ R, so that from Lemma 3.2
and Lemma 6.1 with the change from (x, y) to (x, y) the ratio of visits at
t ∈ R to those at s cannot increase by more than a factor of 8|T |m
ρQ2
. Fur-
thermore, by the definition of x, νˆ, δ ≤ (ǫ∗)2 and Lemma 5.5 there are no
non-satelite exits performed inside of T other than those generated by Player
Two moves b ∈ At2 with wx,y(b) = ξx,y(t). Combined with the fact that the
absorption rate of any move b with gb ≥ 2.4ǫ is altered by a factor or no more
than m/(2ρǫQ2) by the switch to x and that 2ǫ
∗ is greater than the probabil-
ity that the last visit to R was at a satelite exit, we have everything but the
claim that there is only insignificant motion with (x, y) toward absorption
from states in R outside of the set T .
We can break up the absorption from R generated by the strategies (x, y)
in terms of where was the last visit in R. Let t ∈ T , u ∈ R \ T and b ∈ B
be a move such that p(u|t, x, b) > 0, necessarily with p(u|t; x, b) ≥ pt. To
complete the claim of Step 1 it suffices to show that escx,y(u,t)
µx,y(u,t)
≤ 2.5
Q1
for every
such u ∈ R\T .
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Case 1; u ∈ R\T is reachable from T only by Player Two moves
b with gb ≥ ǫ:
It follows immediately from the fact that Player Two has no more than
m|R| moves in R that esc(u,t)
µ(u,t)
is smaller than 2.5/Q1, since any such move
doesn’t return to R with a probability of at least 2.5ǫ and with at least 1−2ǫ∗
probability there is motion from u back to t ∈ T .
Case 2; t 6= s, and u ∈ R\T is reachable by (x, y) from a t ∈ T by
a move b of Player Two with gb < ǫ:
By Lemma 5.5 we have
ptesc(u, t) ≤ gb ≤ 2.3 a(t).
Since pt = a(t)
Q2µ(s,t)
we have esc(u, t) ≤ 2.3 Q2µ(s, t). Since µ is a metric we
have from µ(s, u) ≥ Lµ(s, t)
esc(u, t)
µ(u, t)
≤
2.3 Q2µ(s, t)
µ(u, t)
≤
2.3 Q2
L− 1
≤
2.4
Q1
.
Case 3; u ∈ R\T is reachable by (x, y) from s by a move b of
Player Two with gb < ǫ:
We have ps = 1/Q2, p
sesc(u, s) ≤ gb ≤ 2.3a(s) and
esc(u, s)
µ(u, s)
≤
2.3 a(s)Q2
µ(u, s)
≤
2.3 a(s)Q2
La˜(s)
≤
2.3
Q1
.
In all arguments that follow concerning members of a set T as created
above, for convenience we will write zǫ or Bǫ instead of zγ or Bγ for γ > ǫ.
By Lemma 5.5 there will be no difference in these expressions.
Step 2; For any choice of s ∈ R from Step 1 there is an ǫ˜ simpli-
cation y of Player Two’s strategy y such that together with x the
state s and all states t ∈ T with zǫx,y(t) ≥ ǫˆ ǫ z
ǫ
x,y(s)/(4|N |) are reached
by (x, y) from all of R, and furthermore from inside of T no state
outside of T is reached:
We define yt for all t ∈ T by removing from yt all moves made by Player
Two with a frequency of L/(L− 1)Q1 or less, followed by normalization.
Any t ∈ T that satisfies zǫx,y(t) ≥
ǫˆ ǫ zǫ
x,y
(s)
4|N | by Step 1 also satisfies
P sx,y(s, t) ≥
ǫ ǫˆ β
4.5|N |P
s
x,y(s, t) and z
ǫ
x,y(t) ≥
ǫ ǫˆ β
4.5|N | . Notice that this last condition
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is satisfied by the state t = s. For any t ∈ T with P sx,y(s, t) ≥
ǫ ǫˆ β
4.5|N |P
s
x,y(s, t)
and zǫx,y(t) ≥
ǫ ǫˆ β
4.5|N |
to show that t is reached from all of T with (x, y) by
Lemma 3.4 it suffices to show that for any w ∈ T and any t ∈ T satisfying
zǫx,y(t) ≥
ǫ ǫˆ β
4.5|N | , including s = t, we have that the change from y
w to yw
doesnot reduce Pwx,y(w, t) by more than a factor of ǫǫˆβ/(12|N |
2).
If b ∈ Aw2 is a Player Two move with g
b ≥ ǫ, removing b to form yw from yw
cannot reduce Pwx,y(w, t) by anything more than a factor of ǫ
∗/ǫ. Assuming
that gb < ǫ and removing b to make yw removes at least ǫ ǫˆ β
12m|N |2 of the
motion Pwx,y(w, t) we would have from Lemma 5.5 that 2.3 a(w)L/Q1(L−1) ≥
gbx,yL/(L − 1)Q1 ≥ g
b
x,yyb ≥
ǫ ǫˆ β
12m|N |2
ǫ ǫˆ β
4.5|N |
a(w). This is a contradiction to the
definition of Q1.
Second, we show that, starting at s, motion according to (x, y) never
leaves the set T . Let us assume that u is a state not in T reached by a move
b of Player Two from any t ∈ T played against x and given positive frequency
by y. We need to show that b is not used in y. If t 6= s then by formula (3)
µ(t, u) ≤ a(t)
ptyb
= µ(s,t)Q2
yb
. In particular, by the definition of T and since µ is a
metric,
yb ≤
µ(s, t)Q2
µ(t, u)
≤
µ(s, t)Q2
µ(s, u)
µ(s, u)
µ(t, u)
≤
Q2
L− 1
=
L
(L− 1)Q1
.
And if b is a move at the state s then also by the definition of T and (3)
yb ≤
a(s)Q2
µ(s, u)
≤
Q2a(s)
La˜(s)
≤
1
Q1
.
Therefore we conclude that (x, y) defines one ergodic set D ⊆ T that includes
s and all states u ∈ R satisfying zǫx,y(u) ≥
ǫ ǫˆ
4|N |
.
Step 3; Show that there is a proper choice of s from Steps 1
and 2 with a subset VR of Player Two moves satisfying the condi-
tions of Theorem 1, namely that these moves belong to a subset F
containing s and inside of the ergodic set D such that w˜(t)a˜(t) is a
constant for all t ∈ F and there is a distribution on VR such that
used against x gives an expected payoff to Player One within ǫˆ of
r1(s):
Define U := {t ∈ R | ξ(t) ≤ r2(t)− 2.4ǫ} and define U˜ := {t ∈ R | ξ(t) ≤
r2(t) − 2.5ǫ} ∩ {t ∈ R | zǫx,y(t) ≥ β}. We create a partition {U1, . . . , Uk} of
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the members of U in increasing values of w˜a˜, meaning that s and t belong to
the same member of Ui if and only if w˜(s)a˜(s) = w˜(t)a˜(t). For any state s in
U˜ we consider the sets T (s) and D(s) and the strategies x(s), y(s) ∈ X × Y
as created above in Step 1 and Step 2.
For the sake of contradiction we suppose that there is no s ∈ U˜ ∩ Ui and
b ∈ Bǫx,y(t) with t ∈ D(s) ∩ Ui such that |v
1
x(s),y(b) − r
1(s)| ≤ ǫˆ and there is
no pair of Player Two moves b, b′ ∈ Bǫx,y(R) with both b and b
′ belonging to
the set D(s) ∩ Ui with v1x(s),y(b) and v
1
x(s),y(b
′) on different sides of r1(s).
For every s ∈ U˜ and t ∈ U ∩ D(s) with some move in Bǫx,y(t) used in
yt let v1s(t) =
∑
b∈Bǫx,y(t)
v1x(s),y(b)ν
b
x(s),y/
∑
b∈Bǫx,y(t)
νbx(s),y, the average Player
One payoff resulting from these moves at t. For every 1 ≤ i ≤ k let p(i) :=∑
j<i |Uj|.
We claim that our above assumption implies that zǫx,y(s) ≤ 3
p(i)β/(ǫˆ)p(i)
for every s ∈ Ui ∩ U˜ .
We prove the above claim by induction on i. Let s be any member of
Ui ∩ U˜ , and we assume that |v
1
s(s)− r
1
x(s),y(s)| = |v
1
s(s)− r
1
x,y(s)| ≥ ǫˆ. From
Part 1 and Part 2 we know that the importance with respect to (x(s), y) from
exits outside of Bǫx,y(D(s)) does not exceed ǫ ǫˆ/3 times the importance of the
Bǫx,y(s) moves. Since all the v
1
s(t) with t ∈ D(s) ∩Ui are on the same side of
r1(s) as v1s(s), we are left only with the B
ǫ
x,y moves from ∪k<iUk ∩ D(s) to
counter-ballance the v1s(s) to make r
1
x(s),y = r
1
x,y. We can assume now that
i > 1, since otherwise we would have to conclude that |v1s(s) − r
1
x,y(s)| ≥ ǫˆ
is impossible. By the induction hypothesis the sum of all the zǫx,y(u) over
the set ∪k<iUk does not exceed
∑
k<i |Uk|3
p(k)β/ǫˆp(k) ≤ 2
3
3p(i)β/ǫˆp(i−1). By
the fact that our simplications x(s) hardly influence the expected payoffs
from moves with an absorption rate of at least 2ǫ and by the statement
of Step 1, in order to maintain |v1s(s) − r
1
x,y(s)| ≥ ǫˆ we must assume that
ǫˆzǫx,y(s) ≤
3
2
2
3
3p(i)β/ǫˆp(i−1), and this concludes the proof of our claim.
With the definition of β we conclude that z2.5ǫx,y (s) < ǫ˜/|R| for every s ∈
R, and this means that R could not have been chosen for polarization, a
contradiction.
With the appropriate s ∈ R chosen, we have DR := D(s), xC defined
from x(s) and yC defined from y(s) so that changes are made only inside of
DR, and the exits VR and their distribution as determined by yD come from
the above argument.
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Step 4; show that the moves BR satisfy the requirements of
Theorem 1:
The easiest way to prove that |rx,yR(sR)− rx,y(sR)| ≤ ǫˆ is to return part
of the way back to the space S♯! We let S˜♯ be the space generated by the
almost trivial partition P˜ := {R} ∪ {{s} | s 6∈ R}. With r˜1 the harmonic
function on S˜♯ induced by r1 on the absorbing states, by Lemma 3.5 r˜1(sR)
and r1(sR) differ by at most 4ǫ
∗. Let ν˜♯ be the corresponding measure of the
importance of the exits.
Define a move a ∈ As1 of Player One in the set R to be a principle move if
a is not a limit move and if there is a b ∈ Bs2 such that (a, b) is an exit with
νx,y(a, b) ≥ νˆ − ǫ∗.
We claim that the combination (a, b) of a move of BR with a principle
move of Player One must yield ν(a, b) ≤ ǫ∗. Once this is established from the
definition of BR we need only to break down the sum of the v
r˜1(a, b)ν˜♯(a, b)
over all exits (a, b) with ν(a, b) ≥ νˆ − ǫ∗ and apply Lemma 3.7 to conclude
that r1x,yR(sR) is within 20|N |mǫ
∗/νˆ of r1x,y(sR), that is much closer than we
need it. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that for some principle a and
some b ∈ BR that ν(a, b) ≥ νˆ − ǫ∗. Assuming that the moves take place at t,
we have from the definition of BR that a(t) ≥ yb(qˆ−ǫ∗)(µˆ−ǫ∗)ρ. Furthermore
by definition we have ν(a, b) ≤ xayb/a(t) and by assumption xa ≤ ǫ∗. These
four inequalities are contradictory.
We show that b ∈ BR ∩ At2 with t ∈ P implies v
2(b) < r2(t). If ξ(t) ≤
r2(t)−2ǫ then it follows from Lemma 5.5. If ξ(t) > r2(t)−2ǫ then by Lemma
5.4 all moves have the same auxillary value ξ(t) = ξ(t); it follows from the
smallness of δ ≤ (ǫ∗)2 and formulas (10) and (11) that if v2(b) ≥ r2(t) then
the repeated use of b would result in a higher evalution for ξ(t) because an
undiscounted value of at least r2(t) would be obtained but at much higher
auxillery absorbing rate.
Step 5; show z2.5ǫ(s) < ǫ˜ for any state s that is not in P or is a
satelite of some R ∈ R:
If s is not a satelite and not in P then due to the very small size of δ we
have from (11) that ξ(s) is within ǫ˜ of r2(s), implying that no move b used
at s could satisfy w2(b) < r2(s)− 2ǫ. For a satelite s of R we suppose that
b ∈ As2 is a Player Two move at s with g
b ≥ 2.5ǫ. Such moves have at least
a 2.4ǫ probability of never returning to the set R. The probability of using
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such a move before reaching R must be no more than ǫ∗/(2.4ǫ), and thus the
total probability that it is used cannot exceed ǫ∗/(2.4ǫ(µˆ− ǫ∗)). q.e.d.
7 Signaling
In this section we show that there are approximate equilibria without an
assumption that Player One can send signals independent of the transitions.
The problem concerns the consequences to the players of any moves that
would be used by Player One as a transition dependent signal. For example,
a move of Player One that brings the play outside of the set DR may fail to
be useful to signal her desire for Player Two to use a move in VR, because
outside of DR the jump function for Player Two may exceed greatly his
expected payoff from the moves in VR.
The natural solution is for Player One to have a move inside of DR that
is not used in xC whose use means that the moves VR of Player Two will not
be used, and after a certain quantity of visits to some state in DR it will be
understood mutually that Player Two must use a move in VR. A problem
arises, however, if every such move results in a positive probability of leaving
the set R.
With regard to the next two theorems, we assume the statement and
proof of Theorem 2, which means also that we assume that all the conditions
of Theorem 1 are satisfied. We will add new conditions to those of Theorem
1 and make some minor changes to the proof of Theorem 1. The definition of
S♯ remains, along with its Markov chain transitions, including the p∗R and pR.
The changes begin with the definition of the parts qdR and qR and therefore
everything that follows in the proof of Theorem 1 will be altered as well,
including the introduction of new situations.
Theorem 1’: Assume the following property for every R ∈ R: if every
move a ∈ At1 in DR removed to make xC from x formed an exit against
some Player Two move used in yC , then there exists a set AR of Player One
principle moves in DR such that
1) the sum of νx,y(a, b) for all R exits (a, b) performed outside of DR does
not exceed ǫ˜ ǫ ǫˆ β/3,
2) for every principle move a ∈ AR of Player One used at t ∈ DR with
νax,y ≥ β ǫˆ ǫ˜ ǫ/(3|N |m) we have
∑
b used in yt
C
νx,y(a, b) ≥ (1 − ǫ ǫˆ ǫ˜ β)νax,y
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and therefore also |v1xC ,yC(a)− v
1
x,y(t)| ≤ ǫˆ.
Conclusion: Without any assumption on Player One’s ability to signal
indendependently of the transitions, the game has approximate equilibria.
Proof: Define a member of R to be problematic if the assumption of
Theorem 1’ holds. We proceed exactly as the proof of Theorem 1, except
that for all problematic R we incorporate into the S♯ transition qcR all the
R exits not inside of DR or not created from a combination of an a ∈ AR
with a move used in yC . Recalling that q
d
R is the difference between q
c
R and
p∗R by Lemma 3.7 we still have that ν♯(q
d
R)(v
2
♯ (q
d
R)− r
2
♯ (sR)) is below ǫˆ. Due
to Condition 2 and Lemma 3.7 we have the other requirement for applying
Lemma 3.9. We assume that T is the subset of R that has been polarized.
Define a situation sw at a state s to be timed if there is a natural numberm
such that sw is determined by the present state s and the previous situations
and moves in the last m stages. A normal situation is timed, but the converse
doesn’t hold.
We keep the same situations se, sf and sg from the proof of Theorem
1. The stationary strategies for all the sg and all the se other than a rep-
resentative seR are defined in the same way, and in a non-problematic R the
stationary strategies for sf are also the same.
For every polarized R ∈ T and t ∈ DR we create a timed situation th.
When a situation seR is reached the strategies (xC , yC) are performed, but
instead of moving to a tf or tg there is motion to the timed situation th.
For non-problematic polarized R ∈ T we choose any t ∈ DR such that
there is a Player One move a at t not used in xC and when paired with yC
results in zero probability of leaving the set R. Create a frequency f˜a > 0 and
a number nt such that fa
∑nt−1
i=0 (1− fa)
i = 1− λR, where λR is that quantity
determined by the polarization, and such that for any distinct u, v ∈ DR the
probability of using the move a before moving from u to v is at least 1− ǫ∗.
For all the situations sh for s 6= t the players act according to (xC , yC) and at
t Player Two according to yC and Player One according to (1−fa)xC+fa1a.
If on the ntth visit to the situation t
h the move a was not made, then the
situation following th is some ug. Otherwise if the move a was used on any
visit to the situation th then the next situation is either some uf if an exit
wasn’t used or some ue if an exit was used.
For problematic R ∈ R, let πR ∈ ∆(AR) be the probability distribution on
the AR that is generated conditionally by (x, yC). Choose a natural number
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nR and a stationary strategy x
∗
C for Player One so that with a start at sR
the distribution on the moves AR is πR and for every pair u, v ∈ DR the
probability of using a move in AR before moving from u to v is no more than
ǫ∗ and the probability of using some member of AR at or before the nRth
visit to the state sR is 1− λR. For the situations th with t ∈ DR the players
act according to (x∗C , yC). If on the nRth visit to the situation s
h
R the move
a was not made, then the situation following th is some ug. Otherwise if a
move in AR was used on any visit to a situation t
h then the next situation is
either uf (if an exit was not used) or ue (if an exit was used). At a situation
uf the strategies (x∗C , yC) are also used.
As with the proof of Theorem 1 we must show that the expected payoffs
to Player i from every situation se is within 3.1ǫ of rix,y(s). Given the proof
of Theorem 1 the only additional argument needed concerns the use of exits
in a problematic R before the timed situations have been reached. This did
not present a problem in the proof of Theorem 1 because they were the same
exits used in the situations tf and performed with the same distributions.
If we can show that the total probability of their occurance cannot exceed
ǫ/10, then we get our result by ignoring their influence. Indeed in the Markov
chain defined on S♯ the absorption rate of sR for a problematic R is at least
ρµˆ/(2Q1). By Lemma 3.9 this absorption rate does not fall below
ρµˆ
2Q1
ǫ3|N|
(3|N |)|N|
after polarization. Since this quantity is still very large compared to ǫ∗,
the maximal probability of using such a exit before a timed situation is
reached, we can indeed ignore these exits. (We leave the formal argument
using Section 3 to the reader.)
The situations defined above are not normal and thus do not generate a
stochastic game, preventing a direct application of Corollaries 4.3 and 4.4.
Therefore we must perceive the situations {sh | s ∈ R} for R ∈ T as sub-
games. Concerning the behavior of Player One, we view the entire process up
until the nRth visit to the state sR or the ntth visit to t as a single decision
– whether or not to use a move in AR and if so then which one. This places
Player One’s decisions back into the context of Corollary 4.4.
Concerning the behavior of Player Two, the matter is more complex.
Player Two could have an influence on the payoffs by altering the strategy
yC . Strictly speaking the context would be no longer that of a harmonic
function on a time homogeneous Markov chain – the expected payoff to
Player Two at a state corresponding to a situation th would be changing
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over time. However Player Two’s ability to gain or lose in expected payoff is
conditioned on the use of a move of Player One in AR – this is modeled by
a time homogeneous Markov chain and therefore Proposition 4.2 is sufficient
for the conclusion. ✷
Theorem 2’ The conditions of Theorem 1’ are satisfied always.
Proof: Let (x, y) ∈ X × Y and (xC , yC) be a solution given by Parts 1,
2, and 3 of Theorem 2 for a polarized R ∈ R and we assume that conditions
of Theorem 1’ hold for R (meaning that R is problematic).
1) Consider the strategies played at any t ∈ DR. Suppose for the sake of
contradiction that there is a state u ∈ R\DR where an importance of at least
β ǫ˜ ǫ ǫˆ/3|R| occurs from exits at u. Consider the moves that were removed
from yt to make yt. By Lemma 5.5 at any t ∈ DR no more than
7|R|
ǫ˜ǫ ǫˆ β
mL
(L−1)Q1
of the transition P t(t, u) was removed to make ytC from y
t. On the other
hand, given that every move of Player One removed from xt to make xtC
would have created an exit against some move in ytC , we must also conclude
from the rare use of an exit that no more than 2ǫ∗Q1 of the transition in
P tx,y(t, u) came from such a Player One move. From Lemma 3.3 we have that
u is in DR, a contradiction.
2) Assume that νax,y ≥ β ǫˆ ǫ ǫ˜/(3|N |m) for some principle move a of Player
One at t ∈ DR. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that the probability of
reaching any absorbing state from this principle move is altered by a factor
of more than βǫǫ˜ǫˆ/2 by the change from y to yC. This means that νx,y(a, b)
is at least ǫ
2 ǫ˜2 ǫˆ2 β2
6|N |2m2
for at least one move b that was removed to make ytC
from yt. We must conclude from Lemma 5.5 that β
2 ǫˆ2 ǫ2 ǫ˜2a(t)
6|N |2m2 ≤
2.3a(t)L
Q1(L−1)
, a
contradiction to the definition of Q1.
The final claim follows now from the argument in part 4 of the proof of
Theorem 2, showing that v1x,y(a) is very close to the value of r
1 for all primary
moves. ✷
In the proof of Theorem 1’ we could eliminate the argument that exits per-
formed before reaching a timed situation in a problematic set are irrelevant
if we had a more powerful Markov chain result (that combines the condition
of Lemma 3.3 with the conclusion of Lemma 3.2) or we use Vieille’s approach
to “communication sets” (Vieille 2000c), showing how one can move through
a set R with no danger of leaving it.
49
8 Countably many states
On the technical side, the problem with applying either our or Vieille’s proof
to countably many states lies in the finite state space assumption that given
any stationary strategies for the players and any positive δ there will exist a
δ perturbation of this strategy that is absorbing.
A strategy for finding a counter-example could be following. Construct
an infinite sequence of games Γ0,Γ1, . . . that are positive recursive for both
players corresponding to increasing finite sets S0 ⊆ S1 ⊆ . . . of non-absorbing
states such that for every i ≥ 0 and j ≥ i the moves and their induced
motions inside of Si are the same for all games Γj. Construct a countable
state space by having the game start at s0, define the state space on the
ith stage to be the space Si, and declare that absorption occurs on stage
i if an absorbing state of the game Γi is reached. Furthermore, give both
players the ability to force the game to absorption in the new countable
state space game. Desirable may be games Γi such that with large i the
approximate equilibrium behavior of Γi keeps the non-absorbing play most
of the time close to the set S0 and the minimal number of stages necessary
to reach an absorbing state in the game Γi starting from any s0 ∈ S0 goes
to infinity as i goes to infinity. Otherwise if we allow that absorbing states
are reachable quickly from all non-absorbing states, to avoid convergence
toward large sub-games of essentially equilivalent states it may be desirable
if reaching an absorbing state of Γi on the ith stage of play does not mean
certain absorption but rather a positive probability of absorption mixed with
a positive probability of starting the game over at s0 ∈ Γ0.
There are many ways for a game to have a countable state space but be
played essentially on finitely many situations, for example games that break
down into sequences of sub-games played essentially on finite state spaces.
Also to be avoided are structures that are formally countable in size but
do not exploit the full potential of what it means to have infinitely many
positional possibilities. We believe that the best candidates for a counter-
example will incorporate the concept of a random walk on arbitrarily many
positions, as presented in our introduction. However, to avoid operator ap-
proaches similar to that of the Maitra and Sudderth proof we believe that
there must be a conflict by both players between exploiting their positions
and controlling the behavior of the other player. For this and other reasons,
we believe that the non-absorbing states must have a structure more complex
50
than Z, for example involving joint random walks on the two dimensional
lattice Z2.
Additional Acknowledgment: The author thanks Cafe Europe on
Azzahra Street in Jerusalem for the many hours he worked on the proof at
the cafe.
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